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THE TRUTH ABOUT MEXICO

Being a bird's-eye view of political, social, and economic conditions, together with an analysis of past American policy and a suggestion for the future—based on a tour of observation in Mexico November-December, 1916.

By

David Lawrence

Washington Correspondent of the

New York Evening Post

"Deals frankly with the situation."—*Buffalo Evening News.*

"... well written."—*New York Evening Mail.*

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"The fault is not in our stars, but in ourselves."
—SHAKESPEARE

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Foreword

We talk a great deal in this country about the ignorance of the Mexicans and the stupidity of their attitude towards the United States. We forget that the people of the United States are almost as ill-informed about Mexico as the Mexicans are about this country. It is not the fault of the public that this is true. Trustworthy information regarding conditions in Mexico has been very difficult to obtain. Misinformation has been widely circulated. It has been hard, indeed, to get the facts on which one could rely.

Because this has been the situation, the New York Evening Post sent its Washington correspondent, David Lawrence, to make a tour of observation. He was unusually qualified for the assignment. He had not only followed closely the development of American policy, spending some time in intimate touch with the Mexican-American Joint Commission at New London and Atlantic City, but he had himself visited Mexico as a newspaper correspondent several times before. Mr. Lawrence speaks Spanish fluently. Before coming to the Evening Post a year ago, he was in charge of the Mexican story for the Associated Press while in Washington. Previously — 1911, 1912, and 1915—he was sent to Mexico by the Associated Press. He was at the battle of Juarez which decided the Madero revolution in 1911, winning special recognition from the A. P. for his graphic descriptions. He travelled southward with Madero, visiting Zapata and other chiefs and remaining with him until the Presidential campaign began in Mexico that year. In 1912, Mr. Lawrence was sent again by the Associated Press to take charge of the Mexican story in northern Mexico, where Orozco was in revolt and Huerta was moving northward as commander-in-chief for Madero. In September, 1915, before recognition was extended, Mr. Lawrence visited Gen. Carranza at Vera Cruz, getting interviews from the First Chief on his attitude toward the United States. He has known Carranza personally for many years, as well as the other personalities conspicuous in the daily dispatches from Mexico in the last six years. Mr. Lawrence enjoys the confidence of leading Mexicans of all classes, has many friends in the country, and is an unbiassed observer. He went with no preconceived theories, but in an effort to tell just what he saw, what from his knowledge of the past constituted the fundamentals of the situation, whether it had really improved or gotten worse, and he was ready to write the truth no matter which way it cut. We feel that his articles are as nearly impartial as it is humanly possible to obtain.

The New York Evening Post

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The Truth About Mexico

I.

THE "VICIOUS CIRCLE"

Just How Lack of Money and Economic Troubles Affect the Crushing of Banditry and the Guerrilla Warfare of Villa—Difficulties With Official Reports—International Commission Viewed Hopefully in Mexico.

Mexico City, December, 1916.

IT is a far cry from Washington to Mexico City—some 2,000 miles. But trains, telegraph wires, mails, all the inventions of the day, do not conquer the physical distance. Time—centuries of time—separates the civilizations of two neighboring peoples. Is it any wonder that there are misunderstandings? The single thing that can prevent such differences from leading to wars and bloodshed is a timely exercise of the power of *interpretation*. The higher duty obviously belongs to the nation of more advanced civilization—the United States.

There are human beings south of the Rio Grande—some sixteen millions of them. They are of a race that has demonstrated in other parts of the world its capacity for self-government. There is no good reason on God's earth why another Argentina should not rise at the doors of the United States, and there will be such a country, if only the two peoples can be brought to understand each other. It ought to be a task of the mind, an accommodation of view-points, not an obligation of the hand—the use of force. That will everywhere be admitted as a proper sentiment, but *is it practical?* Therein is the doubt.

It is very easy to shrug one's shoulders and dismiss the Mexican problem with the phrase—intervention eventually, why not now? It is easy also to sympathize so excessively with the *de facto* Government and the principles of the revolution as to be blind to the abuses inflicted upon foreigners and natives alike; to the graft, the dishonesty, the fraud, the dirt, the disease, the banditry, and things even more reprehensible.

It is hardest to be fair about the whole business, to make reasonable allowances to see far into the future and say what really ought to be done by the United States to help Mexico to her feet, or what ought *not* to be done by the United States because it might prevent Mexico from getting her balance once more.

SEEING IS BELIEVING.

If the American people, or any disinterested number of them, could be transported to Mexico for the sole purpose of study and observation, not through the eyes of financially interested people, but with their own powers of scrutiny and broad judgment alertly in play, the duty of the United States would be as clear in the circumstances as it is with any problem of our domestic life wherein opinion crystallizes clearly and potently.

It is unfortunate that more observers do not come. Seeing is believing. Filled with the stories of starvation on every street-corner, widespread suffering and military chaos, this correspondent went to see how Mexico differed from its condition a year ago when the *de facto* Government was recognized; how it differed from the days of the Madero Administration when he saw a fairly normal state of affairs. Possessed of a knowledge of the Spanish tongue gained on several previous sojourns in Mexico, as well as an acquaintance among various classes of Mexicans and foreigners, he travelled Southward to find the facts, to make up his own mind if indeed there is a hopeless case below the Rio Grande, curable only by physical intervention, or whether after all the thing is evolutionary and needs infinite patience while it moves forward.

THE SOURCES OF INFORMATION.

But is it moving forward? In Mexico really making headway? The average American will grit his teeth and put up with a great deal if he can only see progress. Much of my time in Mexico on this occasion was spent in searching out the facts of the past, but during the very period of observation it was possible actually to witness a change for the better, a change which even members of the disgruntled American colony admitted was an improvement on times past, on a year ago, for instance.

In all fairness to the Americans living in Mexico, to the members of our Consular service and diplomats, it can be stated that they are not fully informed. That is only natural. They have other business to attend to than continuously to survey the political, economic, or social conditions of the country in which they live. The American is busy most of the day with his own profession, his mines, his merchandise. The diplomat or Consul sits in his office, engrossed in a mass of routine, and listens to the gossip of the travellers who happen to drop in with the stories they have heard. If the American Embassy in Mexico City were instructed to verify only one of a dozen stories it hears, it would find itself confronted by an almost hopeless task.

But the newspaper men, those who are making a bird's-eye view of things every day, those who are talking with the Mexican Government officials daily and yet are in contact with the foreigners and are able to judge of the merit of their complaints, these unofficial but trained observers really know more about what is going on in Mexico than any other class of folks. The resident correspondents without a single exception, good American newspaper men, who have put up with a lot of personal inconvenience, too, told me that Mexico had improved, and that she was moving ahead, and that if the United States and Mexico once composed their border difficulties, there would not be the slightest doubt about the future of Mexico, for while all her leaders might not be efficient, enough of them were capable, enough were honest, slowly to conquer the graft and the dishonesty, and to establish a strong Government, though it might take a year and possibly two—because everything moves slowly in Mexico. This procrastination is usually the American's first point of misunderstanding. He mistakes slow motion for reluctance, self-sufficiency, or unwillingness.

And are these newspaper men themselves happy? Are things any better for them than the other Americans in business? Not at all. The correspondents wait hours at a time to see a subordinate Mexican official. They put up with vexatious whims of the censor. They work at all hours of the night. They sift out lies and gossip. They run the risks of disease, of being targets for stray bullets in street fights and brawls, of having their pockets picked, of being blown up in trains, but they sit down and tell you in all fairness that, given half a chance, the Carranza Government will pull through; but the facts are in front of you.

TALKS WITH CARRANZA AND OTHER LEADERS.

Without disclosing the purpose of my trip—to form a conclusion as to whether intervention was really necessary at this time—I had the opportunity of talking with Gen. Carranza, then Gens. Obregon and Gonzales, several Government officials whom I had known in the Madero revolution, some "Cientifico" friends who are living quietly in Mexico City and are taking no part in politics; with diplomats, foreign consuls, American business men; in fact, with people of every point of view and of every difference of opinion.

One of these "cientificos," who had every reason to hate the *de facto* Government, but whom I had known years before when he was in the diplomatic service, told me privately that the Carranza Government had done much better than he had ever dreamed it would, and that he believed they would succeed in reëstablishing law and order in Mexico. Such an opinion, considering the source, is obviously a fair one, especially since the man who gave it was himself imprisoned on suspicion when he first returned to Mexico City, but is now quietly practicing law, free from harm, yet not at all in sympathy with the existing Administration.

MEXICO'S TROUBLE ECONOMIC.

To form a judgment of Mexico as a whole it is necessary at this time to investigate its sociological aspects, what has been done toward educating the ignorant masses, what is the condition of the railways and freight transportation, what is Mexico's real financial condition, what do the activities of bandits and rebels amount to, and a series of other subjects that will be described in subsequent articles. Yet in twenty-four hours it is possible for any one to come to the conclusion that Mexico's trouble is nothing more nor less than economic. There is a phrase *"Circulo vicioso,"* used as a rule in connection with the roundabout methods of Mexican politicians, but it applies exactly to the present situation. It begins something like this:

The United States wants Mexico to protect the lives and properties of foreigners. To do this, military discipline and a sufficient army are necessary. To have an army requires money, because troops can be organized well only if they are paid. Diaz had the money. Enough officers would abandon grafting if they were paid any decent compensation to handle the few bandits and rebels. If the peons are not paid by the Government, they will join Villa, Felix Diaz, or any other factional leader who happens to come along.

But American bankers say they can make no loan until Mexico is at peace; the United States Government says the *de facto* Government cannot have ammunition until the stability of the latter is established. The Mexican authorities declare this to be the "vicious circle"—they are denied the very elements which it is necessary for them to have in order to accomplish the tranquillization of their country.

Again, the United States says, "Crush out banditry in Chihuahua and we will withdraw the Pershing expedition." The Carranza Government feels that Villa is augmenting his forces by appealing to the patriotism of the people, by accusing the *de facto* Government of standing supinely by while foreign troops camp on Mexican soil; that's why Mexico can't understand the United States.

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION'S BENEFICENT INFLUENCE.

The American-Mexican Commission meeting at Atlantic City is the very best thing that has happened in the relations of the two countries. I found everywhere among the Mexicans a confidence that the work of the Commission eventually would be a success. It is incidentally a check on the anti-American spirit. It is enabling the *de facto* Government to turn its attention to interior problems without fear of a foreign war.

Alberto J. Pani, who came here to report on the work of the Commission, has explained the American viewpoint eloquently and comprehensively and in a language that the Mexican leaders understand.

The international problem is not yet solved. There will be more discussion, but the horizon is much clearer than it has been. Gen. Carranza and the thoughtful men about him know and appreciate what help or harm the United States can be to them, and they want to reach a friendly basis with their Northern neighbor. The desire to have peace exceeds the wish of a minority for trouble and conflict. What more powerful slogan for Gen. Carranza than "he has kept us out of war with the United States"?

PROGRESS IS SLOW.

Mexico is progressing slowly. Her economic condition, while very serious, is better to-day than it was a month ago or a year ago. All the paper money has been driven out of circulation, and metal-

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lic money, Mexican gold and silver, hitherto hoarded, has come out. Prices remain high, but people can do business, because metallic currency has a definite value; there is no fluctuation.

American money is accepted in many transactions in Mexico, and for the present there seems to be enough to meet the circulation needs. It is a curious phenomenon that the American dollar is worth less than Mexican silver or gold. In normal times, you could exchange two Mexican silver pesos for one American dollar. Now the American dollar bill or silver dollar is worth only one peso and ninety cents in Mexican gold or silver. This is not due to any real depreciation, but to the working of the law of supply and demand. Mexican silver and gold are much scarcer and, of course, are still preferred by most merchants. Eventually, when the American dollar is accepted everywhere or when there is an issue of paper money based on an actual gold reserve, the old ratio of two pesos for an American dollar will obtain. But the vital fact is that the economic situation has been relieved, that business men know "where they are at" and do not have to calculate their prices on a fluctuating paper currency, and that the troops and Government employees are being paid in metallic currency and new Government bonds.

NATIONAL CONVENTION AT WORK.

Other factors have brought about a noticeable change within the last two weeks; the Constituent Assembly at Queretaro has organized and is revising the Constitution. The general elections will be held in February, and the constitutional order has been definitely announced to begin on April 1, when Venustiano Carranza will be inaugurated President. The Courts of Justice and Congress will be formally opened then. The executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Government, hitherto combined under the office of First Chief in Charge of the Executive Power, will go into operation again as in the constitutional régime of Madero, which was interrupted by Huerta's usurpation and illegal overthrow of the Government. The sight of constitutional guarantees, courts of process, and an end of arbitrary decrees only three months away, already has had a good moral effect as have the protestations of the Guatemalan Government that it will not permit the followers of Felix Diaz to make of Guatemalan territory a base of supply.

STORIES OF STARVATION EXAGGERATED.

There is no starvation of any extraordinary character. Some isolated places are suffering—these are in the Guanajuato and Zacatecas districts, but it is due as much to interruption of railroad traffic as the economic conditions of two and three months ago and failure to plant crops on account of military activities. But these situations are being corrected. On the whole, making due allowance for many disagreeable things, conditions are much better than they have been in some time and the general trend of affairs is decidedly for the better. This does not mean that old comforts are available, that Americans and their families can go back as yet, but simply that Mexico is working out her own problem in her own way, a painfully slow process, but not by any means a hopeless one.

II.

EFFECT OF PERSHING EXPEDITION ON MEXICAN INTERNAL POLITICS

Carranza Government Accused of Permitting Foreign "Invader" to Occupy Mexican Territory—Villa Appeals to Patriotism of People to Get Recruits—While United States Insists on Unlimited Pursuit It Really Desires Efficacious Pursuit.

Queretaro, Mex., December, 1916.

INTERNATIONAL affairs are usually the least of Mexican worries—there is so much to be done at home; but just now Gen. Venustiano Carranza is busied with little else. While not admitting it as a rule, most Mexican leaders realize nowadays that in a friendly understanding with the United States lies the key to success for the *de facto* Government.

Alberto J. Pani, who came here from Atlantic City to advise the First Chief of what had been discussed during the eleven weeks of meetings held by the Mexican-American Commission, has had pretty much the centre of the stage; but with rare discretion he has managed to keep details of his mission a confidential affair between himself, the First Chief, and the head of the Foreign Office.

And as he started back to the United States, neither the people nor the press, nor even the officials and military men knew just what communication he was carrying. Somehow there is a faith in the ability of the First Chief to handle the whole business in a manner consistent with Mexican dignity and pride, and nobody becomes over-curious. The only word passed out was that "things are going well in international matters."

One thing, however, is clear. No one in all Mexico could have presented the American point of view better than has Mr. Pani. He has the confidence and affection of the First Chief and of Mexican officials generally, and it was easy to see by the effusive greetings he received that he is popular. Mr. Pani himself was impressed by the courtesy and altruistic spirit of the American

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Commissioners, and he did not fail to give an account of the variety of subjects under discussion, clothing his verbal and oral reports with a fine tribute to the cordial spirit displayed by American representatives.

It was too much to expect that the protocols which Mr. Pani carried from Atlantic City would be signed here without further discussion by the Commission. The stumbling-block is a vital one, but presents no insurmountable difficulty.

PERSHING EXPEDITION AS VIEWED BOTH WAYS.

The United States is willing to withdraw its forces within forty days, providing there is a recognition by Mexico of its obligation to protect the frontier. But the United States announced its intention to pursue to a finish the bandits who may raid American territory. The Mexicans object to-day, as they always have objected, to granting the unlimited rights of pursuit. They claim, as they have argued in their notes about the Pershing expedition, that the presence of infantry, cavalry, and artillery alarms the populace, making them suspicious that the real purpose is not to catch a few bandits, but military occupation—the much dreaded Intervention.

On its part, the American Government contends that to put qualifications or limitations on the right of pursuit is to destroy the efficacy of such pursuit, just as happened when the progress of the Pershing expedition was retarded by failure to permit the free use of railroads or Mexican towns as bases of supply. Nor does the American Government want to give Mexico the reciprocal right of pursuit, though this right is likely never to be used, because Mexican troops will not have occasion to repel raids started from American territory. Yet, for the sake of the national dignity, it is desired by the *de facto* Government.

CONCESSIONS MEXICO WILL MAKE.

The Mexican Government realizes that limitations on pursuit might retard the pursuers and enable the bandits to escape, and is willing to make several concessions. For example, it will permit the immediate entry of American forces, provided there is prompt notification to the Mexican commander of the district affected, limitation of size of the expedition, and agreement that the forces shall be withdrawn as soon as sufficient Government troops are brought into the vicinity of the bandit operations to take up the pursuit. Indeed, the Mexicans would not object to the *continued* presence of the American forces and their coöperation on Mexican soil with the Mexican troops, but the command of such allied columns is naturally wanted by the Mexican authorities. To do otherwise, Mexico argues, would be to yield sacred rights of sovereignty.

The American Commissioners insisted on the right of unlimited pursuit, but the Mexicans refused. It was decided to omit from the protocols themselves the whole business, each Government agreeing to protect its own frontier. But a public statement was made by the United States threatening to send, in the event of a raid like that at Columbus, another punitive expedition, of whatever size it chose, to go whatever distance it thought necessary to pursue the bandits to a finish. But this could lead to war, since the Mexicans again would resent a long-distance pursuit, because the bandits who may have sought to provoke intervention by attacking American towns would not be averse to drawing the American forces all the way to Mexico City, in the hope of entangling them with the constituted Government or the populace, and thus precipitating a general conflict.

Such a threat of unlimited pursuit might have a deterrent effect on bandits and cause the *de facto* Government scrupulously to guard its frontier, but, just the same, the relations between the two countries would not be benefited, for a club would be held over the heads of the Mexican Government which would make everybody, including American bankers, and even foreign residents in Mexico, inclined to discount the moral support by the United States of the *de facto* Government, and keep the international status of things continuously hanging by a hair.

Americans might not be willing to return to their accustomed occupations in Mexico. Any moment they might be ordered out, because of the dangers to them involved in dispatching a punitive expedition across the border that might be combated by the Government forces.

A COMPROMISE PLAN.

There is no doubt that the United States would be doing more to help Mexico by agreeing to some limitation of the right of pursuit, but at the same time insisting that the effectiveness of such pursuit must not be impeded, lest the United States hold itself at liberty to disregard the limitations in cases arising subsequent to the one in which the inefficacy of pursuit will have been demonstrated. Some such compromise seems reasonable and fair. The important point involved, however, in the previous experience of the United States with the military forces of the *de facto* Government sent to northern Mexico to take control of the territory evacuated by the Pershing expedition has been the alleged reluctance, indifference, or incapacity of the Carranza forces.

If the Carranza officers have not been vigilant in their pursuit of Villa (and if this is conclusively proved to the American army observers), then the Mexican Government should be advised of their delinquency, and the information used as a basis for action.

Carranza, it must be remembered, has not yet got a competent military machine. He had put faith in Gen. Jacinto Trevino—a Chapultepec graduate—but the latter has proved a failure. Gen. Murgia is now being tried out, and his defeat of Villa in Chihuahua City has encouraged the First Chief to believe that at last he has secured some one who will run Villa down. Should Murgia fail, Gen. Alvaro Obregon, the Minister of War, will leave his official duties at Mexico City and take the field himself.

THINGS MOVE SLOWLY IN MEXICO.

Things move slowly in Mexico. It takes time for the Mexican Government to weed out its own incompetent men. If the United States can only be assured of the good faith, sincerity, and earnest disposition of Gen. Carranza and his Government to do all that they humanly can to stamp out banditry, forgiveness of mistakes would not be withheld. Such a pressure ought constantly to be exerted by friends of the First Chief. Gen. Carranza is a fair-minded individual and lately is reported to have shown a much more friendly disposition toward the United States and Americans generally—a willingness to go half-way.

If there were only more concrete evidence of his friendliness all would be well, but obviously he cannot do much while American troops are camping on Mexican soil, any more than an American President would dare to be over-friendly with the respective Emperors of Japan and Germany if the troops of either were bivouacked in Texas or California.

The most friendly thing the United States could do to-day to win the friendship and confidence of the Mexicans would be to withdraw the Pershing expedition voluntarily and announce its intention of giving its whole-hearted moral support to the *de facto* Government; exchange would rise in Mexico, foreigners would have confidence that there was to be international comity, and a consequent improvement in economic conditions would soon be apparent. Such an improvement would mean that the Government of Mexico would be able to raise the funds wherewith to pay its troops and organize an efficient patrolling force to prevent border raids and give the necessary protection within Mexico to the lives and properties of Americans and foreigners. It's again the famous "vicious circle"—but the circle must be broken by the United States with just such acts of friendship, or our altruistic words will be, as always, misconstrued and suspected.

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III.

ASCENDENCY OF CIVIL POWER OVER IRRESPONSIBLE MILITARY CHIEFS

Constitutionalist Administration Supported by Military Men—Difference Between Carranza and Madero—Dealing with Marauding Bandits and Train-wreckers—Railroad Conditions.

Mexico City, December, 1916.

POLITICAL intrigue, which is as plentiful in Mexico as the green cactus, and often just as thorny an impediment to progress, has not abated a bit under the revolutionary era; but nowadays it is directed, not against the constituted Government, but looks distantly to the elections of 1920, when Venustiano Carranza's term as President is due to expire.

The election of Mr. Carranza in February and his inauguration in April are foregone conclusions. There is no armed opposition in sight which is of sufficient strength to overthrow Carranza, and within his own party there is none who would essay such a task. Mexico to-day is better off, politically speaking, than it has been in some time. Venustiano Carranza started the revolution against Huerta. He has held his forces intact throughout it all; he has been recognized as Chief Executive of the *de facto* Government.

The men of Carranza's party are in complete control of the Constituent Assembly which is framing a new Constitution for Mexico at Queretaro, and altogether his right to the Presidency is questioned neither on legal nor on moral grounds.

The very fact that all the military men are giving their political support to Gen. Carranza has stabilized conditions very much. But everybody realizes that in the hands of these same military men rests the fate of the present Administration. A triumvirate, therefore, rules Mexico—Venustiano Carranza, Alvaro Obregon, and Pablo Gonzales. The last two command the two largest divisions of the army. At present both men are in Mexico City. A year ago one heard a good deal of talk to the effect that any day Gen. Obregon might break with Carranza. The same gossip is to be had for the asking, but not so many people believe it any more. No one who has talked with Gen. Obregon five minutes would believe it. To be sure, there is more plausibility to the story of jealousy between Obregon and Gonzales, but these proceed from the sycophants and staffs of the two men rather than from themselves.

BOTH OBREGON AND GONZALES ARE PATRIOTS.

Both are capable, patriotic Mexicans and far too shrewd to disrupt the present Government and start the revolutionary business all over again. Mr. Carranza has benefited by such rivalry as has existed between Obregon and Gonzales. At all events, both are united behind the First Chief, and they talk of his election as an assured fact—as if it had already happened. Both Gonzales and Obregon may be candidates for the Presidency in 1920. Each will set out to make a record *under Carranza*. Obregon is now Minister of War; he will probably remain there, for he is an unusually successful military man. Gonzales is a born administrator. He, too, will have an opportunity to show his worth. He is perhaps the most popular of all the Constitutionalist generals, so far as Mexico City is concerned. Foreigners generally say he is eminently fair and capable, and wish for his return to direct charge of the affairs of the Federal districts.

But the interesting thing is that, while ambitious, these men are doing nothing to impede the progress of the *de facto* Government or the political future progress of Don Venustiano. The Constitution provides for *a four-year term and no reëlection*. Both Gonzales and Obregon are under forty, and therefore can wait until 1920. Other candidates from the civil ranks are likely to appear in the interim. Which is the way politics should be in a democracy.

Provided Carranza hews to the line, provided he makes no compromises with the foreigners, provided he follows closely the principles of the revolution, therefore, he can be counted upon to have clear sailing so far as internal politics is concerned. There is no danger that he will depart from his intense nationalism. It has been his creed from the start.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CARRANZA AND MADERO.

The difference between Madero and Carranza—for the comparison must be made in order to forecast whether the Liberal movement will succeed this time—is the difference between an idealist without administrative ability and a practical man with radical principles, a politician of yore, and a capable executive.

Madero, who came into power after a very brief revolution, with the physical and economic condition of Mexico hardly changed from the time of Diaz, lasted a year and four months. During his Administration his forces made little progress against Zapata in the South, and were constantly fighting Orozco in the North. The Carranza party has already held itself together longer than that; in fact, it is now a year and a month since the Carranza Administration was recognized by the principal nations of the world. And Carranza's battle has been to bring order out of anarchy, to keep intact military men of all classes and descriptions, many of them dishonest, many of them so anti-foreign as to threaten international complications, and a great many financially dishonest, plain grafters.

CARRANZA UNDERSTANDS HIS DIFFICULTIES.

Does General Carranza know the weak spots in his own party? Better than any man in it. But he is skilful and diplomatic. When a general is "acting up" and he cannot be handled by telegraph without fear that he will suddenly take up his forces and go off on the war path, Mr. Carranza invariably sends for him, brings him to the capital "for conference." Away from his men, an obstreperous chief is not able to do much mischief, and Mr. Carranza has usually found a way of placing such men where they are either under the eye of another general or busily occupied fighting Zapatistas or Villistas, instead of loafing, which breeds most abuse.

This may sound like craven tactics, but it is the better part of wisdom in Mexico. The Constitutionalist army is really a variation of the old feudal system. The men fight for their majors, their colonels, or their generals. They don't, the ma-

jority of them, fight for any principle. Many of the leaders do, and that's why a revolutionary army is such an incongruous affair. But it is a necessary instrument, and the hardest task is to disband it when it is once organized. Carranza knew from the start that he had to depend on the military men. Little by little grew his own strength, the civil power. It will reach its maximum point with his inauguration as President in April. As his power has increased he has slowly gained the ascendency over the generals, and he is much bolder and far more radical with them, and they obey his orders more diligently to-day than a year ago. Do not suppose that this means perfect discipline, or that Mexico isn't infested by bands or groups of rebels. Scarcely a state that hasn't its marauders, but the surprising thing is that there are *so few* trains blown up, instead of so many, as the American is likely to think, from reading the reports of these "accidents." But it takes only a half-dozen men to wreck a train and run away. It requires tens of thousands to patrol the railroad lines that run through wild stretches of mountain and the wasted plains of desert land.

One good thing the Government is doing now is its sending of troops to points on the line where it suspects disaffection. Hitherto the Government has waited, as a rule, until a train was wrecked before regarding the bandits seriously. The new and cautious method saves rolling stock as well as human lives.

TELEGRAPH COMMUNICATION IMPROVING.

Telegraph communication is pretty good, and is constantly improving. The main lines have been restored. Trains are running regularly to Mexico City from all border points, with the exception of Juarez. In the interior traffic is fairly good to Guadalajara, Aguascalientes, Vera Cruz, and all the larger cities. In a year the Constitutionalists have done remarkably well in restoring railroad communication. Between San Luis Potosi and Tampico the Cedilla brothers are on the rampage, and trains run irregularly. Between Vera Cruz and Mexico City only daylight service obtains, with not as much risk as a month ago, but still with a great deal of uncertainty, for freight especially.

Yet the encouraging thing is that the *de facto* Government is fighting these mosquito enemies as well as it can. And as soon as the mines are reopened and there is more work for the unemployed much of the banditry will disappear. The Government is doing all that most fair-minded people in Mexico think it can do with its limited funds; but so long as the direction of things is forward, and not backward, foreigners and natives alike are hopeful. Patience and hope are Mexico's greatest staples, which is why the whole thing hasn't collapsed ere this, and why there is a mighty good chance that it won't.

IV.

EXPLOITATION OF MEXICO BY THE FOREIGNER A THING OF THE PAST

Anti-Foreign Attitude of To-day a Natural Outgrowth of Diaz Waste of Resources—Carranza Government Quietly Adopting Foreigners' Methods, However—Administrative Changes and New Cabinet Departments.

Mexico City, December, 1916.

MEXICO, for patriotic reasons, just now is anti-foreign, fanatically so. The Diaz régime catered to the foreigners and their wealth, squandering the resources of the country among Americans, English, Germans, etc. Indeed, Mexico under the Diaz Administration was christened "the loving mother of the foreigner and the brutal step-mother of the Mexicans." This state of affairs was one of the causes of the revolution, begun by Madero in 1910 and continued successfully by Carranza, and now one of the inevitable effects is a natural reaction against all foreigners, a political clamor that foreigners shall not possess more privileges than nationals.

Such an intense nationalism has developed that all things foreign are held at a distance, and some time will elapse before it will be possible openly to encourage the development of Mexico's resources by foreign capital—a necessary step in her internal progress as will eventually be discovered, if it is not already known, by the thoughtful Mexican leaders themselves. But "Mexico for Mexicans" is the slogan to-day, and it always is a popular shibboleth in revolutionary days, as a half-century of Mexican history proves. Railways, for example, used to be operated by Americans, Englishmen, or other foreigners. On the National Lines to-day you see only Mexican engineers, Mexican firemen, Mexican conductors, and Mexican porters. All parts of the organization, division superintendents, dispatchers, and clerks, are Mexican, as it is with all other branches of the governmental service to-day.

Yet, while the Mexican leaders are not saying much about it, they are quietly looking about the world to incorporate in their governmental system the very best things that the foreigner has moulded. It is too early to employ foreign experts—that would be resented by the radicals and a political issue made of it—

but in the next few years you will see a number of Mexican commissions going abroad to study educational and technical questions, to bring back the benefit of foreign Governments' experience in commercial and industrial problems.

Indeed, Gen. Venustiano Carranza is planning, together with the Constituent Assembly, which is revising the Constitution at Queretaro, an administrative reform of far-reaching importance to Mexico. The executive branch of the Government will be reorganized with an eye to a distinct separation of the executive departments from dangerous political influences.

TO ABOLISH VICE-PRESIDENCY.

In the first place, the Vice-Presidency will be abolished. Why? Simply because it is a constant source of danger. The Vice-President has been next in line of succession to the President in event of death. His ambitions might lead him to intrigue or so to prejudice the status of the President politically as to encourage assassination or other means of deposing him. This has happened before. So it has been with other Cabinet Ministers, from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs down. Realizing that the Minister of Foreign Affairs has been second in succession (or even first, if the Vice-Presidency happened to be vacant), the portfolio has been too often filled to meet internal political expediency, rather than the needs of the office. Consequently Mexico's foreign Ministers with few exceptions have rarely been diplomats. The temptation is to name one's successor by making him first Minister for Foreign Affairs, thus perpetuating a system and denying the people their right to choose their own President.

All this is now to be changed, and by the simple and democratic process of having the people through the Congress choose a successor to the President, no matter how the vacancy occurs, by death, resignation, or physical disability. The Congress must choose the President. It is much better than our own system in the United States, when a chance may remove an efficient President and leave the country in the hands of a man who never was intended by the people to be their Chief Executive. They have no other remedy.

Gen. Carranza thinks, too, that by keeping his Cabinet Ministers out of the line of succession he can appoint a Minister for Foreign Affairs who is really fit for the place, someone who knows something about diplomacy and international affairs. One more change is needed to safeguard the new system. Members of the Cabinet ought to be ineligible for selection by the Congress to succeed to the Presidency. This would put a check on intrigues with Congress. It is being discussed and may be adopted, though the objection has been raised that too few men of executive experience will then be available for choice.

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY TO BE FORMED.

There are to be several other changes in the organization of the executive power. Besides suppressing the Vice-Presidency, the incumbent of which office could hitherto take over any Cabinet portfolio he desired, the Department of Public Instruction and the Ministry of Justice will be abolished. In order to take the question of education out of politics, a commissionership of education will be created to coöperate with the State Governments in promoting education. A national university or council will be formed, composed to some extent of foreigners, which will make the question of education an unofficial and less public affair. This will permit of aid from foreign institutions of learning.

Similarly, in order to correct abuses which have arisen in connection with the Ministry of Justice, a department that had administrative charge of the courts and too often has influenced them, the portfolio will be done away with entirely. In its place there will be an Attorney-General, but he will not be a member of the Cabinet. He will be merely a general counsel for the Government, and will not have any more influence before the courts than other attorneys. The purpose of the move is to make the administration of justice by the courts absolutely independent of politics, a judiciary in strength coördinate with the legislative and executive branches of the Government.

The method of selecting a President by the Congress has worked successfully in Peru and other Latin-American countries, though to be sure in some of the Latin republics, as Chili, for example, the French system of making the Cabinet responsible to the Congress and dependent on its votes of confidence is in operation. There has been serious discussion here of a parliamentary form of government for Mexico, much along the lines of the French plan, but Gen. Carranza in his address to the Constituent Assembly, pointed out several objections to it, proposing instead the Presidential system in vogue in the United States with the right of the people to vote directly for President of Mexico instead of indirectly through electors.

WHEN CARRANZA IS PRESIDENT.

Mexico has had many provisional Cabinets in the last few years, and Americans who have come in contact even with some of the members of the First Chief's Cabinet to-day are not impressed with the calibre of Mr. Carranza's aids. But a revolutionary government is a different thing from a constitutional government, just as are a *de facto* administration and a *de jure* administration in the laws of nations. Mexico will have, beginning about April 1, a *de jure* government, because by then Venustiano Carranza and a Congress of Deputies and Senators will have been elected. When Mr. Carranza is President, and not First Chief, he will have more real authority, he will not be so dependent on the revolutionary factions or parties or the military groups, but will be free to select a Cabinet for its administrative ability rather than its political strength.

Already, Mr. Carranza has in mind a man for the portfolio of Foreign Affairs who has had some experience in Europe as a Mexican diplomat. A change in the Ministry of Finance also would not be surprising, especially if the right kind of man with banking experience, and a head for finance, who at the same time is thoroughly in sympathy with the principles of the revolution, can be found. The truth is that most of the financiers and bankers have been "cientificos," and the material from which to select a Minister of Finance is not all that could be desired or that Mexico is really capable of producing. It is too soon after the close of the revolution to appoint a Minister of Finance who hasn't participated politically in the revolution, even though he may not have been active on the other side. But within a year or two it is not unlikely that Mr. Carranza will be compelled after all to choose a non-political person to handle the huge question of finance.

NEW DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.

The Department of Communications and Public Works undoubtedly will be headed by Ignacio Bonillas, at present a member of the Mexican-American Commission. He is an engineer of experience, and already has initiated some important construction work in harbors and public buildings. At present the management of the railways and the telegraph and mails is in charge of two general directors, who report directly to the First Chief. These two directors will be kept hereafter entirely independent of the Department of Communications, or any other Department in the Government, being responsible only to the Executive.

The Department of Fomento (colonization and development of resources) will continue as before, but it will no longer have charge of industrial affairs or interstate commerce. This is now to be supervised by a new Cabinet officer, who will be known as the Minister of Commerce and Industry. This Department will be copied closely after the Departments of Commerce and Labor in the United States, and an effort will be

made through it to solve Mexico's increasing number of strikes and labor troubles, as well as the business of the Federal Government, with mines, foreign concessions, and the enterprises of foreigners generally. The head of the new Department will try to conserve Mexico's equities and at the same time try to encourage the country's development by foreign capital in legitimate ways. There will also be a Federal Bureau of Health and Sanitation, which is a new thing for Mexico. The Department of War will continue as before, as will the portfolio of Gobernacion (or interior administration), the connecting link between the state government and the federal authority. This makes a total of seven Cabinet positions instead of eight, as heretofore.

From this brief outline, it will be seen that while the outcry against the foreigner has many political aspects of an internal character, it is bound to be short-lived. And as soon as the Mexican Government assures itself that the immense resources of the country are not to be gobbled up through false titles and special privileges, the foreigner will be welcomed. The radicalism of to-day will inevitably give way to a more equitable and conservative attitude towards foreigners, but there never will be such exploitation by foreigners as that for which the Diaz system was responsible.

V.

RELIGIOUS CONTENTION A FACTOR IN MEXICO'S SOCIAL UPHEAVAL

Some of the Reasons for the Hostility Against the Catholic Church—Objections Not to Mexican Priests but French and Spanish Clericals—Possibility of an Independent Catholic Church of Mexico.

Mexico City, December, 1916.

RELIGIOUS contention has played no small part in Mexico's social upheaval, and one need not be a church partisan to observe that while freedom of worship is now granted to Roman Catholics as well as other sects by the *de facto* Government in conformity with established law, the fight against the Roman Catholic Church, its alleged intolerance, and its remarkable hold on the masses here, has only begun.

The fact is that unless the Church at Rome sees the handwriting on the wall and adopts a more liberal policy in Mexico, permitting Mexican priests and a Mexican hierarchy to conduct its services throughout the country instead of French and Spanish *padres*, there will be eventually a Catholic Church of Mexico, separate and distinct from the Church of Rome.

This suggestion indeed is being seriously advanced in the press of Mexico, especially in *El Pueblo*, the semi-official organ of the Government. Of the merits of the argument it is not necessary here to speak. The truth is that most of the men in the Carranza Government, originally Catholics, are anxious to liberalize the Catholic Church, to make it more in sympathy with the national spirit, and if they do not succeed an independent movement may result which would mean that the Church at Rome might lose its church properties here, for the new church might lay claim to them.

The general expectation is that so radical a step will not be necessary, and that the Church of Rome will make needed changes in the personnel of the clergy. But in the midst of the controversy and discussion there is good ground to believe that Protestantism will gain a strong foothold.

ATTITUDE TOWARD PROTESTANT MISSIONS.

As a matter of fact officials of the *de facto* Government feel kindly disposed toward the foreign mission movements of the Protestant churches. The Protestant missionaries help in the establishment of schools and generally in educating the ignorant thousands. Anything that helps to educate Mexicans is considered by the Carranza Administration a good thing, and the particular grudge the party in power to-day has against the Catholic Church is its alleged obstruction of education and progress.

The Catholic Church as it has existed here—the institution itself, not its service—has been charged by the Carranza Administration with playing politics. The Church is supposed to have furnished funds to sustain Huerta, is accused now of supporting Felix Diaz, and, through refugee priests in the United States, is held to be conspiring for intervention. So the enmity is considered in Mexico to be a more or less reciprocal affair.

And while the controversy is going on some interesting things are happening. Most of the Constitutionalist officials do not attend any churches, and say they will not until Catholicism is placed on a non-political and broader basis. All the wives and daughters, however, of these same Government officials are pious Catholics—they never miss mass, and they frown on religious discussion, change, or reform. The women are content with the Church as it is, which makes one doubt frequently whether the present anti-Catholic movement will make the headway which the Government authorities predict.

THE GASPAR RIENDO INCIDENT.

The friction is not without its humor-

ous side. Recently there arrived in Mexico an Italian by name, Gaspar Riendo. He claimed when in company with certain church dignitaries to be *persona grata* to the Pope at Rome, indeed to be the representative of his Holiness. To others, Riendo spoke of the need for a separate church—a Mexican Catholic Church. He is supposed to have talked that way among the Government officials, contending that he had always been in sympathy with the revolution.

Canon Antonio Paredes, who is the nominal head of the Church in Mexico, having been left in charge by Archbishop Mora y del Rio, declined to recognize Riendo and openly accused him of being an impostor. Riendo's credentials were demanded, but he claimed they were stolen from his baggage by the Constitutionalists at Vera Cruz. Nobody would have paid any attention to Riendo except that Padre Jesus Cortez, head of the most fashionable church in Mexico City, declared himself in complete sympathy with Riendo. Then Canon Paredes cabled Rome, and in a few days produced a message from the Vatican, signed by the Papal Secretary, denying all knowledge of Riendo or his mission.

Still Cortez would not repudiate Riendo. This led the Canon to denounce Cortez and finally to dismiss him. Padre Cortez refused to heed the order, claiming Paredes had no such jurisdiction, whereupon the latter announced through the press that any one attending mass celebrated by Padre Cortez would be excommunicated. For a time other priests officiated, but suddenly on Sunday morning Cortez reappeared, which resulted in a panicky exodus of worshippers. Traffic on the street in front of the church was stopped for a long time while the crowd waited to see if Cortez would remain after such a demonstration of disapproval. He stayed, and several hundred Catholics didn't celebrate mass that day. Now most of them attend other churches, and the Sagrado Corazon is deserted, though every Sunday people peep in to see if Cortez is still there. Riendo, in the meantime, has disappeared.

THE CHURCH IS BLAMED.

From the point of view of the *de facto* Government officials, the Church is responsible for what is now happening, and that had the Church obeyed the reform laws of 1857, which provided for the separation of church and state, there now would be no difficulty. Incidentally the Constitutionalists claim they are to-day merely enforcing those laws. Indeed, these statutes are being incorporated in the new Constitution at Queretaro without change.

Briefly, the laws of 1857 forbid convents and monasteries and the appearance in public of priests in clerical garb. The Church is forbidden to hold property and is not permitted directly or indirectly to participate in politics or the affairs of the Government. Diaz, and then Huerta, winked at the open violation of these laws. The Constitutionalists have enforced these laws rigidly. There have been excesses. Some of the radicals have gone beyond the law, but to-day the boast of the Government is that worship in the Catholic Church is permitted on an equality with all other religions. There is no persecution now of the priests, though discontent among the Mexican clergy with the Spanish and French priests is growing.

OUTCRY A REVOLUTIONIST'S TENDENCY.

Mexican Government officials do not feel very kindly toward Cardinal Gibbons and others who have attacked them in the public prints or have worked against their recognition by the United States. The Mexicans say the American Catholic Church has been used by Rome to protect vested interests in Mexico, that the quarrel is political, and that if it keeps up there will be a reaction against Catholicism itself. But it is well to remember that the outcry against the Church in Mexico only comes to the surface in revolutionary days. It is a good deal like the anti-Wall Street campaigns which are launched to gain votes in our political campaigns. The lower clergy have a grievance against the French and Spanish priests—the foreigners. The Church of Rome has undoubtedly been somewhat backward, as, for example, with respect to matrimony, the fees charged being so far beyond the means of the poorer classes that in many States, especially on the ranches and farms, the ceremony has for years been entirely dispensed with. Then there have been too many churches and too many priests in some cities.

There is nothing inherent in the Catholic religion to which the Mexican objects. Its imagery and symbolism is what fits his conception of life. But the management of the whole business, the system, the plethora of foreign priests and churches, its part in politics—constituting a system—is something far different from the religion itself, especially as it is known in the United States. It is the system, the foreign priests, to which Mexicans object primarily, and from one discontent have arisen many others.

ATTITUDE OF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT.

The Carranza Administration rode into power on an anti-Catholic programme which was not altogether unpopular or it never would have been pressed. All radical administrations become conservative in time. The Carranza Government will be busy with too many things to continue the assault against the Church beyond the lines already laid—an enforcement of the Reform laws of 1857, and if the Church of Rome handles the matter skilfully, it can prevent a serious schism. For the thing has by no means gotten out of hand. The Mexican clergy are an important factious still.

In all this it is known that the United States Government has taken a lively interest, but beyond insisting on the principle of religious tolerance and non-discrimination they cannot diplomatically intercede. Even this is stretching a point, for religious questions are strictly internal affairs. The American Government must phrase its inquiries vaguely arguing merely that religious freedom is a characteristic of civilized nations and that to preserve the friendship of the United States and other nations there should be no persecution of Catholics as such, or interference with their customs of worship. This is given as the advice of Mexico's "nearest neighbor."

But the Mexicans claim they are permitting the greatest freedom, are merely enforcing the law, and that if the Catholics keep out of politics, cease supporting revolutionary movements, and substitute Mexican clergy for Spanish and French clergy, the Church will have nothing to fear.

VI.

MEXICO REBORN

Social Aspects of Six Years of Internecine Strife—Country is Paying Dearly for Her Revolution—Curbing Lawlessness and Immorality.

Mexico City, December, 1916.

"WELL, what of the people?" Every once in a while somebody in the midst of a discussion of Mexican politics or economic conditions here asks that question. It is not necessarily asked in a spirit of criticism, implying that the sixteen millions of people are innocent bystanders, helpless victims of 250,000 of their number who comprise the grand total of the whole revolutionary business, army, officials, politicians, chiefs, et al. But the revolutionists, or Constitutionalists as they prefer to call themselves, sit down themselves occasionally—that is, the philosophically inclined among them do—to discuss what effect six years of internecine strife has had on the younger generation, what it is doing to the civil side of things, what morality or immorality it is producing, and what will the Mexico of to-morrow be like, built as it must be on the foundations of to-day.

Since the subject is sociological and not political, impartial opinion is easily discovered. The first effects of the five years of revolution have not been favorable. There has been a retrogression in morality, which includes, of course, qualities of honesty and uprightness as well as the fundamentals of family life. This is indisputable because it is obvious. But the Constitutionalists are quite right when, admitting the ill-effects, they argue these to be in conformity merely with the laws of social progress and predict an inevitable trend upward on the chart of morality.

To inspect Mexico from the point of view of the sociologist, it is necessary to remember that class lines are very indistinct; it is difficult, unless one knows this incongruous population of mixed bloods and races, to tell where one class ends and another begins. Similarly you must take horizontal as well as perpendicular cross sections. There is an upper, a middle, and a lower class division in southern Mexico which differs from those same three in the central country, and is also unlike the classes in the north of the republic.

NORTHERN PEOPLE STURDY.

The people of the north of Mexico are of the sturdy race—they began this revolution, and they are the virile persons who forced a radical programme on a more or less decadent ruling class in the capital. But that is the geographical division: every large country that begins far outside the tropics and spreads down toward the equator, a land of almost perpetual sunshine, breeds persons of varying complexions and varying energies. Anyone who has lived in Mexico a week knows what you mean when you refer to the "Indians," or the "peons," those primitive, half-clad, dirty, barefooted men, women, girls, boys, babies, of brown face and jet black hair and scarcely any education. Also there are those of the Indian type, just slightly more advanced—they may wear shoes instead of sandals and trousers instead of mis-shapen pantaloons rolled to the bare knees. But improvement in dress does not always signify education. The majority of the people in Mexico are tanned—either by the sun of to-day or the sun which browned their Indian ancestors. Only when you have talked to them and determined the limits of their minds can you tell whether you are approaching the upper classes. As a rule the pure whites, the second generation of Spaniards, those who emigrated from the north of Spain, are people of education and culture.

Still culture is a hard word to define with respect to Mexico. Even the lower classes are passionately fond of music. They have an inborn affinity for fine art. And gentility, instead of savageness, characterizes them for the most part.

NEED OF EDUCATION.

Of course, in the upper classes are found Mexico's finest-looking men and women, but not necessarily its most capable people. In the Diaz régime, the more or less well-to-do, the first families, ruled the country. The Carranza Government is really a most representative affair—in an ethnological sense. For in it the middle class, composed of the original Mexican type—a combination of Indian and Spanish—predominates. There are in the Government, too, men whose parents have been full-blooded Indians—themselves peons—and there are men also of the cultured class which has always managed to keep on top, but their liberalism, not their money, gives them power to-day.

The Constitutionalists who rule Mexico are northerners. Gen. Carranza, Gen. Obregon, Gen. Pablo Gonzales, Ignacio Bonillas, Alberto Pani—all these leaders are from the Mexican states nearest the Rio Grande. How much the influence of contact with the ideals of the United States may have had in giving these men the courage of their convictions is hard to say, but undoubtedly they have caught some of the spirit of the great republic beyond.

I was walking one day with one of the Constitutionalist leaders, a man of technical education, but interested, too, in Mexico's social needs. We almost stumbled over a man and boy asleep, folded in blankets under the sky. They lay alongside some freight cars, wherein were troops, wives, children, and camp followers.

"It will take generations," he said, "to make this a rare sight in Mexico. Education will do it—education that the 'cientificos' said wasn't good for the people, education that the Catholic Church wouldn't give them, education that we must give them and will. It alone can change all this."

CURBING THE LAWLESSNESS.

On the theory that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, the old régime kept the lower classes in constant ignorance as well as in constant awe of those above. To-day the peons still impress you as afraid any minute they will be enslaved as happened on one pretext or another in the days of the Porfirista system.

Hasn't liberty given way, as it usually does, to license? There can be no doubt of it. Serious abuse of new-found liberty, excesses of all kinds, robberies, bandit depredations, and a wave of murder and crime have followed in the wake of the revolution. An unscrupulous class

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usually rules a revolutionary army, and if not savage at the outset, its leaders become so when intoxicated with power. It is simply a drop from ordered life to the primitive state wherein might makes right, wherein self-preservation and selfishness are the only laws that are recognized.

But all this was inevitable and the Constitutionalist leaders are absolutely confident that they will be able to curb lawlessness. In fact, they have already stamped out a good deal of it. Yet it must of necessity leave imprint on the young, the boys of fifteen to twenty, whose growth has been parallel with anarchy, a disrupted Government, the collapse of courts, and a reign of terror.

Immorality practiced by so many of the captains, colonels, and generals with impunity has had a correspondingly bad effect on the young in those districts where the revolution has trampled under foot the old order of things, but fortunately the fighting has been going on in comparatively few places, in the small towns along the main railroad lines. The big cities have changed hands frequently, but with few exceptions has there been much fighting in them. On the ranches and farms, on the plantations, in Yucatan, for example, or the state of Guadalajara, the normal appearance of things is preserved, the social structure, such as it was, is intact.

MEXICO CITY AND GUADALAJARA.

Mexico City and the city of Guadalajara are the two largest cities of the republic, the former with nearly 600,000 and the latter with at least 120,000 population. Streets have not been kept up and are sadly in need of repair, but the community life is much the same as it has been. Guadalajara has been least affected of all the important cities, and is flourishing to-day. Mexico City has a ramshackle appearance, but is slowly being put into habitable condition by the municipal authorities. The chief of police, once a light-opera comedian, has turned out to be an efficient administrator and one who has reduced the number of street holdups and café brawls to a rather respectable minimum—at any rate, one that compares not unfavorably with what happens on the Bowery in New York or South Clark Street in Chicago.

Life among the better classes is somewhat different. There depressed spirits prevail. So many friends have been exiled! Properties have been taken away. Many of the houses are now being given back to the "cientificos." The Constitutionalists are really doing a commendable work in correcting the earlier abuses of their military commanders, but much is still to be desired before Mexico City will be able to resume its gay life of yesteryears.

Theatres, operas, moving-picture shows, and burlesque performances are in full swing in the city. They always have been, no matter what faction held the capital. Mexicans must be amused. A circus moves about the country, drawing big crowds. And midst all the fighting and the money famine, one of the finest looking edifices in the world—the National Theatre of Mexico—is slowly being completed.

Is Mexico better off to-day, are the people happier, more contented with the rights and liberties now restored to them by the revolution? The physical facts admit of only one answer: Not yet. Revolution in established institutions means not simply destruction of crops, marauding armies, and the spread of disease. It means famine and high prices and suffering. Mexico has suffered much. The benefits of a revolution are not *immediate* benefits. It took a long time to reconstruct France after the Revolution. Our own Civil War brought on a terrible period of hardship for the South. Mexico is paying dearly for her revolution, but it was inevitable; it had to happen. And disturbed by no outside force, the revolution will, as it has in other parts of the world and in other periods of history, prove a godsend to the country, for Mexico is being reborn.

VII.

GRAFT—PURE AND SIMPLE

Reign of Fraud Makes Internal Problem for Carranza one of Serious Difficulty—His Hand Firmly Set Against Grafters—Pani's Contest With the Military.

Mexico City, December, 1916.

THIS is a story about graft. And if graft is too generic a term, let it be called loot, fraud, plunder, robbery, burglary—or anything else that expresses the idea of deliberately taking *from* one person that which belongs to him and calmly taking *unto* one's self his property, usufruct and all.

Graft is not an innovation, however, in Mexico—nor is it peculiarly endemic to the tropics. Whispers of it are sometimes heard in the United States, but for plain, open, unblushing graft, which includes speculation with a fluctuating currency, the manipulators down here could give the brotherhood up North a long handicap and beat them handily.

Before proceeding further, however, to explain the devious ways by which graft is practiced here, it ought to be stated at the outset that the honest men in the Carranza Government know who the dishonest ones are, and that Venustiano Carranza, First Chief, and soon to be President, knows more about them than any one in the republic. And what he is doing to stamp it out, how he actually is succeeding, the risks he is taking with some of his military chiefs—all this is but a small part of the burdens of the man who is trying to establish a government in Mexico. He has an unenviable job. So, when you read reports of loot here and there, of forced loans, of the

stealing of horses and cattle, of the looting of stores, remember that there is one man on top whose power is slowly increasing, and who will not right away, but in the course of time, get the upper hand and enforce discipline in a manner that will make Porfirio Diaz seem like a mollycoddle. He has the backbone to do it, but he also has the good sense not to try to reform everything at once. In any revolution such as has to do with fundamental principles of government, the first task is the actual organization of the government, and after that, after authority is once definitely distributed, then attention can be paid to the morals of the community.

WHEN MIGHT MAKES RIGHT.

But the story of graft is an interesting commentary on what happens when a state is dissolved, when the state disintegrates and really for a time sovereignty goes back to the several elements or factions that comprise the people and where might makes right as well as law in the land.

What is happening now is an evolution, a gradual return to discipline and order, and if the process seems lame and slow, do not forget that the revolution has been going on for five years, and during that time the civil strife, the marauding armies, and raiding bandits have done quite a complete job of it—that is, of disintegrating the authority and the physical structure of the land.

Unscrupulous persons exist in all parts of the world, but Latin-America has an abundance of them, especially among the lower classes. One always had to mind his watch and his pocketbook in Mexico City, but to-day he must sew them up in his clothes—and then he isn't sure of keeping them, for just the other day a blithe young Mexican returned to one of the clubs and discovered that somebody in the street car, on the street, somewhere, had cut a neat little slit just above the pocket of his trousers and extracted therefrom his neatly arranged packet of bills.

Street cars are infested with pickpockets, also with germs. Moral: Don't ride on street cars. Ride in the coaches (hacks) or in automobiles, if they are available, though you must spend quite a fortune doing so. Still it may be an economical investment, a wise insurance.

THE THIEVES' MARKET.

There is a place in Mexico City the Mexicans have named "the Thieves' Market," recognizing the character of the merchandise sold therein. Prices fluctuate merrily. They take anything you will give almost. It is a cut-rate shop, and at the entrance there are dozens of unintelligible signs. They ought to read, "Nothing but Stolen Property Accepted Here."

You can't leave a bicycle or an auto around, if perchance you must run in at the telegraph office, the post office, or the theatre. Either you must devise a lock as big as the machine itself or hire an army of brown-faced *muchachos* to watch the vehicle—boys whom you survey with that comfortable expression of security which at heart you know is really a fear that the youths may be in collusion with the thieves themselves!

But these are petty forms of stealing. They are mere matters for the municipal police to attend to, and little by little the nation's capital is getting a decent force of police and detectives. Some day—possibly another six months or year—things in your pockets may be a little safer than they have been. In fact, the improvement in the last six months has been noticeable. More autos are on the streets, more bicycles, and more people go strolling at night. There hasn't been a hold-up of consequence in several weeks.

ENGAGING A FREIGHT CAR.

The real graft in Mexico is in the money speculation, in the misuse of freight cars, the commandeering of supplies by corrupt generals and colonels. Any one who has tried to do business in Mexico in the last few years knows it in graphic detail. If you had managed to get a consignment of goods to Mexico by steamship, the problem was to get it overland by rail to Mexico City. Rolling stock is scarce. Perhaps by paying the military commander at the port, or some subordinate, a neat little sum, you could get a freight car for your goods. It may be some one else's freight car, paid for and contracted for weeks in advance, but what matters that—what's a freight car compared to some good old-fashioned silver or gold, especially with paper currency going down, down, down every day? So you yield to the extortion, only it is hard to say when the next contribution must be made, that is, who will hold up the car en route and demand his fee. And so it has gone for months. The offenders have been the military. Generals and colonels early in the revolution seized freight cars and day coaches and Pullmans, and converted them into grotesque private cars. The troop trains—ordinary box cars—were converted into dormitories which for sheer dirt and smell would drive the average American crazy if he had to live therein twenty minutes.

Few people have known of the real fight against these things which the Carranza Government has made. Alberto Pani, president of the National Railways, began last summer a campaign against these military men; and, with the cooperation of the First Chief, issued the most drastically worded circulars and orders. They have been effective, too. Pani defied generals and colonels. One night the passenger train which was due to leave Mexico City for Laredo had a handful of passengers. A Mexican and his wife had a drawing-room reserved many weeks—it is so hard to get accommodations. And they had paid for it in metallic currency, too. A general strolled along and ordered them out, proceeding to make himself at home. Mr. Pani happened to be about and heard the discussion. He ordered the general out. The latter pointed a pistol at the diminutive form of the director of the railways. Mr. Pani stood his ground, called the general a coward, reminded him of the First Chief's strict orders on the subject of commandeering trains, and told him to get out—which he did. Pani has done this same thing over and over again. And employees who don't insist on transportation and tickets from military passengers are heavily fined. Slowly the evil has been eradicated until to-day, if you buy a ticket and a berth, it is yours. And the railroad receipts have increased tremendously.

EXCHANGING YOUR MONEY.

Last but not least among the offenders against honesty and other outworn virtues here are the *coyotes*. This name, taken, of course, from the plunderous instinct of the animal of that species, is applied to the brokers who buy and sell exchange. If you have American money and want to get Mexican paper currency, they will tell you the rate is going up, that you had better exchange to-day and get more bills than might be forthcoming to-morrow. On the other hand, if you have Mexican money and want to exchange it for American dollars, they will lament the general condition of affairs, they will tell you Carranza is going to fail, that the Government is collapsing, and that the number of American dollars you can get for your Mexican money to-day will be cut in half to-morrow—any day.

Then, too, with the Government often decreeing the rate of exchange, knowing in advance what are to be the decrees with respect to all other phases of exchange, officials tip off friends, in fact work with them frequently in acquiring large gains on the very changes themselves. It is hard to trace this form of graft, but fortunes have been made that way. Any one who knew a month ago that all the paper currency in Mexico would be valueless thirty days afterward, that only Mexican gold and silver would be in circulation, that the amount of these coins was wofully small, and that they would therefore be at a premium, need only to have quietly exchanged $1,000 in American money for 2,000 Mexican silver pesos. Ordinarily a peso is worth fifty cents, and two are exchanged evenly for an American dollar. But with the Mexican

peso at a ten per cent. premium, the value of your 2,000 pesos at the end of thirty days would be $1,100 in American money, and you would have $100 profit without turning a hand, without doing more than asking your bank to exchange American currency for Mexican coin.

PAPER MONEY DRIVEN OUT.

Some few people, of course some in the Government, must have profited handsomely by all this. The incident is mentioned merely to illustrate what Don Venustiano must contend with while an impatient group of foreign nations prod him for not preventing a handful of ruffians from blowing up a train in some unpronounceable region of the mountain districts where bandits hold sway.

To-day all the paper money has been driven out of circulation. Thousands of people have been left with the bills. These are useless because no one accepts them, but, just the same, I heard the other day of an American who bought 80,000 peso bills for $80 in gold, and intends holding on to them for some mysterious reason. Maybe he has inside information that these bills some day will be retired at, say, a peso for ten centavos of Mexican money, or a nickel in American money. In that case he would collect $16,000 in good coin of the realm with American eagles inscribed thereon. These may be vague dreams, but the thing to remember is that not a few people in the Government itself consider these manipulations merely "honest graft."

All of which is a necessary if not inevitable phase of revolution. And while imposing hardships and sufferings on the people, rich and poor, whose property is subject to such kaleidoscopic change in value, still the comforting thought is that at last a start has been made toward curing these evils. Mexico has been honest in the past, and nothing has happened in the last five years to alter the fundamental character of most of the inhabitants, business men included. It has been simply a reign of disorder. There has been no law. Therefore, no one has seen fit to obey any. Now, with the early return of constitutional order and courts of justice, something different should result.

VIII.

ARMED INTERVENTION

The Pro and Con of It—Revolution Has Put Thousands Under Arms and Seasoned Them—Why Mexican Patriotism Would Produce Bitter Opposition—President Wilson's Popularity in Mexico.

Mexico City, December, 1916.

PEOPLE in the United States talk about armed intervention in Mexico with a clean-'em-up spirit of braggadocio. And some Mexican refugees as well as Americans who have lived in Mexico sit about in New York and elsewhere and calmly tell you: "Intervention will be welcomed; there will not be much resistance; it will be over soon, because the people will be well fed, and——"

Thus runs superficial opinion, but no one can really think that way who has penetrated the Mexican character—not the refugee class which is in the United States to-day and wants to conserve its Mexican properties, thinking an American occupation will prevent confiscation by the radical revolutionists now in power—but the rank and file of the Mexican people.

They talk about intervention here, abstractly and academically. It is, of course, always impending—a possibility. Most of the foreigners have blown it through thousands of smoke-rings until they believe in its inevitableness just as they believe in the cycle of seasons. They think it will help them, that an American occupation will mean freedom of operation and the same privileges they used to have under Diaz. But they are mistaken. The American troops were in possession of Vera Cruz a year ago, and the most unpopular names among the American business interests were those of the army officers, who had direct charge of various municipal departments. The army officers insisted that the Americans must be subject to the same rules and regulations as Mexicans, and considerable chafing ensued which is not yet forgotten in the American colony.

But what would the Mexican people really do if intervention did come? It is a delicate subject to talk about in Mexico—that is, among Mexicans—but I managed to introduce it occasionally in the conversation so as to find out what Mexican folks thought about it.

MEXICAN PATRIOTISM.

The most interesting experience was at tea one Sunday afternoon in the home of a leading family. The mother is half-American, and, of course, both she and her son of twenty speak English. We were talking of the political situation. The properties of the family had been taken away, and such as remained yielded about ten dollars a month of actual value, though thousands in worthless paper currency. It had compelled big inroads on savings, for there was not enough income from rents to pay a single servant. Fortunately, the real wealth of the family was more than adequate; but obviously the family felt bitterly to-

ward the Carranza Government. The mother spoke of intervention as a probable remedy.

"What would really happen if intervention did come?" I asked.

"I would be glad. I don't think there would be opposition. The people would be satisfied with any Government that kept them at work," she replied. But there was an interruption. The son spoke.

"Oh, no, mother," he said; "there *could* be opposition. Why, do you think I would stay at home? Yes, I know we have American blood in us, but, mother, we are more Mexican than American. And wouldn't Juan go, too?"

The son was speaking of a younger brother, now at school—but all the schools have now been militarized. And the mother confessed she had been worried many times lest the younger boy should go off with the army before she had a chance to see him.

Theoretically, therefore, there would be no opposition, but actually, of course, there would. Mexican patriotism is as strong and passionate as American patriotism. One Mexican of a prominent family told me that he had never carried a pistol in his life, but if the American troops came he would not be without one. He would resent any insult, he would fight the hated invader every chance he got.

BY NO MEANS A WALK-OVER.

This would mean endless sniping, and before the American forces got through they would have to apply practically the same measures of force that the Germans thought it necessary to use in Belgium to disarm and conquer the civil population.

But, from a military point of view, there ought to be no misunderstanding of what sort of fighting would be encountered. There would be a good deal of marauding, banditry, and guerrilla warfare. Thousands and thousands of soldiers would have to be used to garrison the lines of communication, and in the last few years, it must be remembered, the Mexicans have become quite expert in blowing up bridges and dynamiting trains. The revolution has taught them much about warfare.

For five years at least 150,000 men have been under arms, have withstood the rigors of the climate, have become seasoned fighters. The American troops, unused to the country and bushwhacking, would find their task an unusually difficult one.

Nobody—not even the Mexican—has any doubt that the United States, with its immense resources, eventually would conquer. But the Mexican can go down with as much resignation, and can take defeat as heroically, as any people in the world. To die for one's country is as nobly extolled in Mexico as in the United States or on the battlefields of Europe. Human nature is not a bit different in Mexico.

But, assuming that intervention did come, assuming that an American occupation finally did tranquillize the country, and the United States set itself to putting Mexico's house in order, to settle the problems that have caused popular discontent and revolution, to whom, to what class or group, would the administration of affairs be given? It must be to the Mexicans, for certainly all the professions of the United States that it doesn't want territory would be put to a test, and Latin America would be not the least interested spectator. Would the United States deliver the Government into the hands of the "cientificos," the old ruling class? If that was done, there would be peace only while the American forces were on Mexican soil. Revolution, which had been interrupted by the American intervention, would break out anew.

LET MEXICANS WORK IT OUT.

The revolution has been based on principle. It is a popular contest. It arises from the aspirations of a people to self-mastery. If revolution followed American intervention until the people really got possession of their own Government, the natural question is, Why not let the revolutionists, who have finally gotten the upper hand now, work the thing out themselves? It not only saves bloodshed, saves millions of dollars, and does not bring into question before Latin America the real motives of the United States in this hemisphere, but *it makes Mexico solve her own problem.* By so much does it add to Mexico's self-reliance in having patriotically come to her own rescue, but by just so much does it make the successful and popular Government that arises in Mexico the real friend of its neighbor, the United States—a practical Pan-Americanism.

Let the discussion of intervention continue on theoretical grounds. Let any one who doubts Mexico's national spirit make his own inquiries here. It would not be an armed occupation such as was witnessed in Cuba, a small country, easily traversed, but a war in a foreign land, in thousands of miles of desert, among mountains, and among a strange hostile people, who would fight to the death.

President Wilson's policies may not have been popular in Mexico because of things the Mexicans did not and do not yet understand, but throughout Mexico, rightly or wrongly, the impression was strong that the election of Hughes meant certain intervention and war. Never before in the memory of older Mexicans has there been such interest taken in an American election. One of the Mexican newspapers got a bulletin service from the Associated Press, advertised it several days in advance, and on the night of election the streets were jammed for many blocks.

WILSON'S POPULARITY IN MEXICO.

The Mexicans bet heavily on Wilson. They seemed to think he ought to be elected because he was for peace with Mexico. And when he did win, the exultation was not concealed. An American President was never more popular in Mexico than when Woodrow Wilson was finally declared reelected. And the expectation that Mr. Wilson will keep the United States at peace with Mexico is deeply ingrained. He has a great deal more influence in the situation than he ever had. He has a more powerful instrument than armed intervention. He has a moral power which, if properly exercised, can make Mexico understand the American spirit and the American people in such a way that a better start than ever before can be made to remove anti-American feeling. Hostility to the American has existed here ever since the secession of Texas and the War of 1848. It made Mexico nationally suspicious of the United States. And never did an American President have such an opportunity to reveal America's real purposes and real motives as has Woodrow Wilson to-day.

IX.

MEXICO'S CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

Difference Between de Facto and de Jure Government in Mexico and How the Constitutional Order Interrupted by Huerta is Being Restored—The Outlook as to Suffrage, Male and Female.

Queretaro, Mexico, December, 1916.

TO most people in the United States the frank admission of the Carranza Government that it is not operating under the Constitution of Mexico, that it is not the legally constituted government of the republic, would seem an odd denial of its own authority. But it does not pretend to be a constitutional government, and it never did. Gen. Carranza and his party obtained recognition as a *de facto* Government. They never asked to be considered otherwise. Only when there is a general election, which will be held in another two months, will a *de jure* Government arise, and only then will the country resume the constitutional order, courts of justice, and regular legislative and executive processes.

The word "resume" is used advisedly and requires a retrospect. The Carranza party never recognized Huerta as a legal Executive—nor did the United States. Madero was, of course, legally elected in 1912 to fill out the unexpired term of Porfirio Diaz, which would have been until 1916. Huerta's *coup d'état*, his overthrow of Madero, therefore, was considered by Carranza and his adherents as an interruption of the constitutional régime of Madero. In fact, the Carranza revolutionists took the name "Constitutionalists" and maintain it still as a symbol of their creed, their programme—to restore constitutional government in Mexico. The first step was to get military control of the country—to get power. The revolutionists succeeded. Their organization they called the Constitutionalist army, and Gen. Carranza, though not a military man, they designated in a conference of leaders held at Guadalupe in 1913, as First Chief of the Constitutionalist army in charge of the executive power. The programme of that conference has become famous as the Plan of Guadalupe. It called for the formation of a Constituent Assembly, which was to revise the Constitution and arrange for a general election of President and Congress. It was tried out at Mexico City and Aguascalientes in 1914, but both conventions were failures because Francisco Villa and his brigades of the Constitutionalist army refused to permit them to be carried on without military duress. And the separation between Carranza and Villa grew out of the contested procedure at those conventions.

THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.

Now Gen. Carranza and his followers have succeeded not only in gaining military control of all but one of the states of the Republic—Chihuahua—but the First Chief has been recognized by the principal nations of the world as the Chief Executive of a *de facto* Government. Mr. Carranza is therefore at the present moment carrying forward his plans for restoration of constitutional order laid two years ago.

The Constituent Assembly is now meeting. Its 250 members were recently chosen by the people in elections which permitted the widest freedom of discussion and the exercise of unrestricted suffrage. The Assembly is modelled closely after that which followed the end of the French Revolution. The Assembly's work is to revise the Constitution which Mexico adopted in 1857, arrange for the general elections of President and Congress, and to fix the date for the resumption of constitutional order. As soon as these things are done, the Assembly automatically expires. Some of the members, no doubt, will be elected as regular Congressmen and Senators when the general elections are held in February for the new Congress, but that, of course, rests with the people.

The point is that Mexico at last is getting back on the foundations of law and order interrupted by Huerta's illegal and arbitrary overthrow of Madero. Strictly speaking, the United States need not have recognized the Carranza Government until it established a *de jure* Government, but in the nature of things the recognition of the Carranza party as a *de facto* Government was in accord with the accepted principles of international law, because the Carranza party, having gained military supremacy, really possessed the elements of sovereignty in the country. Sovereignty, according to both ancient and modern political theory, resides always in the people, and when their designated spokesman—the President, or king—abuses his power, they rebel. The triumphant revolutionary party in effect recovers possession of the sovereignty, the power previously abused, and then makes up its own mind to what man or group of men the authority should thereafter be delegated.

PURPOSE OF THE ASSEMBLY.

The Constituent Assembly's purpose is to construct on behalf of the people a new government, to give it a revised Constitution, and really procreate a legal Executive, a legal Congress, and a judiciary of lawful origin.

The Assembly has had under consideration all the decrees and acts of Citizen Carranza, First Chief of the Constitutionalist army, in charge of the executive power. In his speech to the Assembly, he gave an account of his custodianship of the executive power. Some of these acts will be incorporated in the revised Constitution, being embodied in new principles of authority, and others will be given the sanction of law when the new Congress meets.

The Constitution will not be completed for another month. It is an interesting document, as tentatively drawn, a rather progressive chart of rights. Take, for instance, the woman suffrage article which it is being proposed shall be included in the Constitution. All women would not be permitted to vote but only unmarried women who are occupied in professional work—such as the law, medicine, teaching, bookkeeping, stenography, etc.—but not in manual labor. The daughters of wealthy people would not be permitted to vote, the theory being that they are dependent on others who exercise a voice in the community. Similarly, the moment any of these young women, who are entitled to vote because they are self-supporting, become married, they lose their franchise, as the husband thereafter can vote for the family. The argument that is making headway in the Assembly is that, if an ignorant day-

laborer can vote, certainly a school teacher in the same community ought to have the right of suffrage.

SUFFRAGE RESTRICTIONS LIKELY.

Eventually, of course, not every day-laborer will be permitted to vote. Revolution, however, sprung from the people wouldn't dare to incorporate any restrictions on voting in the Constitution at present, but, after a time, perhaps a few years, doubtless before the 1920 election, suffrage will be restricted to those in the republic who can read and write, and women of all classes may then be granted suffrage.

It is interesting to observe, however, that the members of the Constituent Assembly are anxious to put at the disposal of the republic the *intelligent* voters so that public opinion will rule, so that it will be impossible for a military dictator to drive thousands of ignorant peons to the polls through local military commanders to vote a certain way under penalty of arrest and other punishments in vogue in the days of Diaz.

Much interest was taken in the election of Deputies to the Constituent Assembly. There was plenty of rivalry, and it looked for a time as if Gerzayn Ugarte, Carranza's own private secretary, might not be elected from his Congressional district in Mexico City. Not so many votes were cast in the general elections for Constituent Assembly, but the interest taken was greater than in any previous election, and an indication that, although the triumph of Mr. Carranza is a foregone conclusion, there will be spirited contests for places in the new Congress as well as for Governorships. Indeed, in the state of San Luis Potosi, eight men have announced themselves as candidates for Governor, and since there are no primaries, the one receiving the highest number of votes in the election will be declared elected. At the same time that elections for the national Congress and Governors of states are held, the people will vote for members of the State Legislatures, every one of which is to be constitutionally organized.

NATIONAL HOUSE-CLEANING.

It is a constitutional house-cleaning that the Carranza party has brought about—a revolution in every sense of the word. And just now Mexico is in the midst of these organizing processes. Within two months the elections will be held, the date has not yet been set, but inasmuch as the inauguration of President is fixed for April 1, everybody expects the elections to be held in February or March. The campaigns already have begun in some states. The Constituent Assembly is to fix the date for the elections, and make all the arrangements.

Why is the Constituent Assembly being held in Querétaro? For sentimental reasons, chiefly. Here in this quaint town ended the dictatorship of Emperor Maximilian, the invader. On a lonely hill, a mile from the city, an ancient chapel marks the historic spot where Maximilian was executed in 1867. The Mexicans consider that their era of liberty, their emancipation, began then. They feel inspired that another era of liberty will begin with the revision of the Constitution here, and arrangements for a resumption of the constitutional régime.

Querétaro also was chosen because it is a quiet place, lacking in diversion or distraction. The Assemblymen can be the more easily kept at work. Given a lot of theatres and amusements such as Mexico City has, the Assembly might have by now hardly started its labors. As it is, the Assembly has divided into numerous committees and is moving ahead with an air of sober confidence.

As a whole, the Congress doesn't look very intellectual, but then that distinction is not always vouchsafed to Congressmen in the United States either. Actually there are about fifteen men in the 250, who really can be said to lead, which is a good percentage as Mexican legislatures go at any time, normal or abnormal. Of course a higher grade of Mexican will sit in the new Congress. The men chosen for the Assembly were in each instance pronounced Constitutionalists, men known to be in thorough sympathy with the principles of the Revolution.

The military have nothing to do with the Constituent Assembly. Few soldiers are bivouacked in town—simply a police garrison. The first two weeks of sessions were secret while credentials were examined. The only outsiders admitted were from the press. The discussion was mostly about personalities. I was present one day when two officers strolled in, thinking the meetings were public. One Deputy made a point of order and the military were politely asked to leave—which they did with apologies.

FREEDOM OF DEBATE.

The Assembly meets in the Querétaro Theatre, a typical opera house of the size which a city of 50,000 would be expected to have. Its seating capacity, balconies and all, would not exceed 500. It is an orderly Assembly, but the utmost freedom of debate has characterized the sessions. Mr. Carranza himself has appeared before it only once, when he read his address, but since then the leaders have been in consultation with him, as happens in the United States. But in reality, the Assembly is laying down the law. It may not be an imposing-looking affair, but the members know what they want. They know the loopholes in the old Constitution of 1857, whereby dictatorships were established and the rights of the people wrested from them. They are deliberately closing up those holes now and moulding a democracy, a government suited to Mexican conditions of life, a government for which they have shed much blood.

They have suffered extremely in order to get the opportunity of reform which they have to-day. Their eyes are not focussed on international obligations yet. They are intensely absorbed in their internal problems. That's why foreign nations are a bit impatient of what seems to them Mexico's slow progress. It is as fast, however, as can be humanly expected, but the prodding by foreign Governments won't do any harm. It ought to quicken the Mexican leaders and keep them conscious of the breadth of their task as well as the breakers that lie ahead of them. Eternal vigilance, demanded for the success of individuals, is not less the obligation of friendly Governments.

X.

EDUCATIONAL REFORM

Each State Controls Education, but Plans Being Laid to Co-ordinate System—Sending Mexicans to United States to Study Aids International Amity—Many Thousands of Children Have No Schooling Whatever.

Mexico City, December, 1916.

As you travel across the Rio Grande, you are immediately impressed with the fact that you have turned the pages of history back a century or two—you are in the midst of a primitive civilization. It is not that the complexion of the people or their habits of life are different. It is that millions—literally millions—of those around you can neither read nor write, and out of a population of 16,000,000 at least two million still speak Indian dialects and communicate crudely with their countrymen.

Mexico's greatest problem is how to educate her illiterate masses—for an underlying ignorance is always a potential source of revolution.

Opening schools and planning a uniform system of education that will take hold throughout the republic is neither a spectacular nor dramatic affair. It doesn't get headlines. But while in Mexico to-day it would seem that improvement of living conditions, and a stabilization of the central Government were the most pressing and urgent things to be done, it is gratifying nevertheless to discover that First Chief Carranza is personally assisting in educational reform in Mexico, is directing that liberal appropriations from the funds of the central Government be made for teachers' salaries and new schools, and is also supervising the expenditures as much as possible so that there may be no waste.

Andres Osuna, who is general superintendent of education in Mexico City and is an intimate friend of the First Chief, having been at the head of the board of Education in the latter's native state—Coahuila—makes it his business to consult the First Chief at least twice a week. The more one digs into things here, the more one finds that Venustiano Carranza has upon his shoulders innumerable burdens. And how he manages to do as well as he does with some of the inefficient men he has to deal with, who have not yet learned the fundamentals of service, is indeed a mystery.

EDUCATED IN THE UNITED STATES.

It is fitting that a man like Andres Osuna should be at the right hand of Carranza in educational matters. Osuna, of course, has the confidence of the First Chief. He also is thoroughly familiar with American systems of education, both in the primary and secondary schools and colleges, being himself a graduate of Bridgewater Normal School, at Bridgewater, Mass., and having received B.A. and M.A. degrees at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn. He has lived for many years in the United States and knows the value of the American plan of education.

While most Mexicans look suspiciously on all plans for coöperation with the United States, Osuna has no such fear. He is in constant correspondence with educators in the United States, seeking for Mexico the best that it is possible to get for existing conditions in the disturbed republic. Perhaps the most interesting development in this line is the splendid effort of Stanley Yarnell, of the Friends' School, Philadelphia, who has launched a plan for university scholarships in leading universities and colleges in the United States for deserving Mexican students. Already about fifteen to eighteen scholarships have been obtained, and nearly twenty other colleges have endorsed the plan. Some institutions have offered full scholarships, board, tuition, and all. Others have given tuition and suggested opportunities for student self-support. Catalogues and literature from American colleges have been sent to the Department of Education here for general distribution, and altogether the Mexicans are quite enthusiastic about the plan.

Already, too, Gen. Carranza has given his consent for a delegation of Mexican teachers to accept the invitation generously extended by the National Association of Teachers to attend their meeting in the United States in June. Unfortunately, the vacation for schools in Mexico comes in January and February, so it will be difficult to obtain leave of absence for many teachers, but at least twenty-five will make the trip.

MEXICAN SCHOOL REGISTRATION.

Mexico's school registration is far below what it ought to be. Based on percentage estimates in the United States, there ought to be in a place like Mexico City at least 150,000 children in school; but there are only 120,000. Thirty thousand boys and girls, therefore, have never attended school. It is a nucleus of ignorance—an ultimate instrument for revolution and bloodshed or banditry or other lawlessness. In Michoacan, which has 1,000,000 inhabitants, there ought to be at least 150,000 in attendance, but only 50,000 are registered. Figures for the entire nation, taken in 1910, when Diaz was in power, show that only 1,000,000 children were in school, out of a total population of 15,000,000, which should send 3,000,000, or at least 2,000,000 to school.

The Diaz Government did not believe in spreading common-school education. There was no system. Even Mexico City was never divided into school wards, and sometimes there were two and three schools in the same block. Sanitation was neglected. All this has now been changed. Not only has the city been divided into districts, with a superintendent directly responsible for each district, but special attention has been given to the health of the children and the sanitation of buildings. A board of physicians—fifteen in all—has been organized, who, together with twenty-six nurses, make constant rounds in the schools. Also, at least fifteen male teachers, whose irregular habits did not, in the opinion of the general superintendent, make them fit to teach the young, have been dismissed.

The curious thing about education in Mexico since the revolution began in 1911 is that the schools have never been closed by any faction. For a time in the state of Morelos, overrun by Zapatistas, it was dangerous for any employee of the state Government to be about, and it was impossible to send salaries to the teachers. Classes were suspended, but as soon as the civil authorities were able to recover possession of the cities, schools were promptly reopened.

TEACHERS IN DEMAND.

Some splendid things have been done to forward education in the state of Yucatan, from 300 to 400 new schools having been opened there. A few new schools have been established in Mexico City, but lack of financial resources has been a severe handicap. There are 78,000 children enrolled in the 450 primary schools and 93,000 in the private schools of the capital.

Teachers are in demand. The Carranza Government has raised the salaries of male instructors 25 per cent., in order to attract men of education to pedagogy. From five to six million dollars of Mexican gold ($2,500,000 to $3,000,000 in American money) has been spent by the Carranza Government in each of its two years of Governmental control over the schools. And, in spite of the pressure of other things, Gen. Carranza has found time to visit the schools regularly—in fact, he has visited them already more times than did any Executive or Minister of Public Instruction before him.

Unfortunately, the need for economy has forced the closing of one large normal school here. The Government had been spending $87,500 in American money for the support of a school which had only 130 students. So it was decided to take $20,000 of this money and send these 130 students to normal schools in other cities, paying all their expenses, and yet saving $57,000 by closing down the normal school in the capital. Teachers, as a rule, don't want to go to normal schools outside of the cities, but the Carranza Government is about to establish sectional normal schools, so that teachers will be drawn from them for surrounding rural communities. Puebla, Vera Cruz, Guadalajara and Jalisco have fine normal schools. Some of the normal-school graduates who stand highest in their work will be sent to the United States for post-graduate work. Six are now in Massachusetts, studying at the expense of the Carranza Administration—two at Worcester, one at Bridgewater, and three at Boston.

WANTS UNIFORMITY OF SYSTEM.

Essentially the problem of education in Mexico as in the United States is in the hands of state authorities. States' rights is Constitutionalist doctrine here. Gen. Carranza many years ago while Governor of Coahuila engaged in a long controversy with the central Government as to the right of the state of Coahuila to run its own educational system without interference by the Federal authorities. He still stands for that principle, but recognizes the value of informal coöperation and the need for uniformity in system. He hopes to obtain this, however, through the unanimous approval by the states of the plans now being unofficially recommended to the different Governors.

Osuna, who was at the head of the School Department of the state of Coahuila for many years, is the author of the plan which has been approved in principle, though not in detail, by First Chief Carranza. Its object is to divorce the schools from politics. Instead of having one man at the head of the educational machinery of every state, Osuna's proposal is to substitute state and municipal boards of education. The members would be chosen by the governors of the city councils, respectively. Of the five members of each board, one would hold office for a single year, a second for two years, a third for three years, and so on, so that there would be but one vacancy each year, and political changes would not so easily affect the continuity of educational work. There would be, of course, a general superintendent and assistants, but these men would be selected by the state of municipal boards and would map out courses of study and submit textbooks for the approval of the governing boards.

LINING UP STATE GOVERNORS.

In the United States many cities have solved the problem of education versus local politics by abandoning the electoral method of choosing a superintendent of schools and appointing a non-partisan school board to supervise the entire system for a city. In Mexico, particularly, where school-teachers occasionally get prominent in local politics, it is desirable to remove their positions as far as possible from the political spoilsmen. The Massachusetts plan of selecting superintendents by examination is a conspicuous part of Mr. Osuna's plan. He has written a long prospectus on the whole thing, and is soon to make a tour of the country urging the different governors to adopt the plan he has sponsored. He has asked the governors to convene a committee of the educators of each state so that he may present the merits of the plan. Of course, the Federal Government is interested in the adoption of the plan, but each state will of course have the right to reject the same if it desires. Mr. Osuna hopes to persuade the state authorities to make permanent provision for educational funds. Hitherto, there has been appropriation only when a surplus existed in state revenues. He is suggesting that each state fix by law that a certain percentage of the income be applied for educational needs.

Mexico's educational future is, theoretically speaking, a bright one. The desire to educate is a sincere one, but the only question is how funds are to be obtained with the Government so desperately in need of money for military and other administrative purposes of prime importance.

ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL AMITY.

It is a marvellous thing that out of its limited funds, the Constitutionalist Government has been able not only to keep the schools going but actually to open new ones and show conspicuous progress in so many localities. But the work is hardly begun. Millions of children are not yet in schools, and it will probably be another year before this phase of Mexico's reconstruction will get the attention it deserves.

On the whole, the efforts of the Constitutionalist Government in educational lines have borne much fruit. And the willingness to send Mexican young men and women north of the Rio Grande to study is not the least important part of it all. These future principals and superintendents should be effective missionaries for the cause of international amity. Close coöperation between the educators of the United States and Mexico will do a great deal toward making the peoples of the two countries sincere friends.

XI.

VENUSTIANO CARRANZA—THE MAN

Some Aspects of His Political Philosophy—The Struggle for Individual Liberty as Opposed to Oligarchy—Preachments Based on Experience with Diaz Group.

Queretaro, Mex., December, 1916.

WHAT kind of a man is Gen. Carranza? Does he hate Americans, does he breathe anti-Americanism at you, does he grow furious over the prolonged stay of the Pershing expedition; in short, is he reasonable at all, is he the kind of man that ought to be President of a republic? These questions flitted through my mind as I strolled toward the house of the First Chief for an interview. They were questions which, I knew, issued from the curiosity of the average American, but on which any one who had had the opportunity of really knowing the First Chief could not have the slightest doubt.

Six years ago, just this month, I met Venustiano Carranza for the first time. He was in Washington incognito. He was a Senator in the Congress under Diaz, but fled the capital to join the Madero revolution. He was of impressive presence, tall, characteristically slow of speech, serious—almost solemn. I have seen him many times since, but I doubt whether he ever looked the part of Chief Executive of a republic more than he did to-day. He is big, broad-shouldered, firm of grip, his face browned by the sun, his eyes half-obscured by his heavy blue spectacles—a strong-looking, erect figure. And as I stepped forward to shake hands he smiled. It was a sympathetic smile, yet as he rose, he plainly showed fatigue. He had been at it from 5 A. M. He had seen a constant stream of callers from all parts of the republic. He had dispatched a mass of domestic business, and he had spent two hours discussing with Alberto Pani the international situation as it was being handled by the joint Mexican-American Commission.

WANTS TO BE FRIENDLY WITH US.

We talked a long time. The First Chief gives, of course, the usual stereotyped interview of prepared questions and answers, but sometimes he will talk freely with the understanding that he is speaking privately, and not for quotation. I carried away the impression that he wanted to be friendly with the United States, but that he didn't dare be so, no matter how advantageous it might seem, until the American troops were withdrawn from Mexican soil. I told him our forces had been anxious for some time to leave, provided the Commission could come to some agreement about it, that hardly anybody in the United States wanted the Pershing expedition to remain, and that public opinion favored the withdrawal, and had left the whole business to the Commission to arrange.

The First Chief looked at me with an expression which, translated into words, meant: "I'd like to believe you, but I've heard that story before." For the fact of the matter is, the Mexicans do not trust the United States, they don't really put any faith in our promises, and if you are alone with them, in their confidence, under circumstances which will draw from them their private opinions, you will discover that, however unintentional it may have been on the part of the United States, the American Government has made some moves which to the Mexicans look very suspicious. Jumping into Mexico without even asking the permission of the *de facto* Government, and then apologizing for the "error" may have become stale news in the United States, but it still rankles here. And again, the statement issued by the Secretary of War at the direction of President Wilson, a day or two after the Pershing expedition was ordered into Mexico, and saying the American forces would be withdrawn as soon as sufficient Government forces arrived on the scene to take control of the situation, is remembered for its non-fulfilment. Enough Mexican forces were soon concentrated in that vicinity, but the American troops kept on and on toward Parral, disregarding the Mexican Government's efforts to put some limitation on the pursuit. The Carranza Government had feared that Villa's game was to draw the American forces through the sparsely populated regions all the way to the City of Mexico, and thereby precipitate a general war.

KEEPS HIS WORD.

Gen. Carranza is not narrow. He is simply the inflexible kind who, when he gives his word, keeps it, and when you give him your word, expects you to keep it. He wants to know why the Pershing expedition has stayed so long on Mexican soil, what has it been doing for the last three months, and why must Mexico be forced into the humiliating position of promising a score of things in order to rid her territory of foreign troops who by no right of international law can occupy the soil of a nation with whom relations of peace exist unless specific consent therefor is given. And certainly Mexico never consented to the entry of the Pershing expedition. That is his viewpoint.

But while Gen. Carranza was in a more or less you-must-show-me attitude, somewhat skeptical that the United States was really sincere about withdrawing Pershing since it had entangled the Commission with so many other questions which it was his understanding would not be discussed while American troops were on Mexican soil, nevertheless I really believe that if the United States, by its acts, showed a genuine friendship for Mexico, it would have in Venustiano Carranza a real friend.

The First Chief is no ordinary individual. None but a man of his fibre could have kept his motley forces intact for a whole year without funds, without much support from foreign governments, with internal intrigue, with graft, with bad crops, and with economic conditions of a distressing character. He is a type of Mexican statesman of the old cultured class in Mexico, long in public life, yet thoroughly progressive and liberal in his views. Probably the best exposition of his political philosophy was contained in his opening address to the Constituent Assembly here, which is now revising the Constitution. It was not fully reported in the newspapers because cable tolls were high, but it gives as good an insight into Venustiano Carranza as anything he has ever written or spoken. It was a speech of 9,000 words, but I have selected some excerpts here which illustrate the breadth of vision of the man, his liberalism, his keen desire to rid the people of dictatorships and tyrannical oligarchies—his creed of democracy. He said in part:

HIS REFORM PLANS.

"I cannot say to you that the project I present to you is perfect, as nothing human can be perfect; but, believe me, gentlemen, the reforms I propose are the outcome of sincere conviction, personal experience, and the expression of my deep and ardent wish that the Mexican people may attain to an enjoyment of liberty, education, enlightenment, and progress which will earn it respect abroad and peace at home. Gentlemen, I will summarize the reforms to which I refer, in order to give you a brief and clear idea of the principles that have guided me, so that you may decide whether I have attained the object I have had before me. The object of every Government being to protect the individual—that is to say, the varied elements in society which go to make up the whole, unquestionably the first requisite to be filled by a political constitution must be the protection given to individual liberty.

"The Constitution of a nation should not seek, if it is to be long-lived, to establish artificial restrictions between the state and the individual, as if it were desired to increase free action on one part and limit it on the other, in such a way that what is granted to one shall be a condition for the protection of the other, but should seek to arrange matters so that the authority given by the people to their representatives (seeing that the people cannot exercise such authority directly) be not used against the society or public which appoints it, and whose rights must remain intact. Because we must not for a moment lose sight of the fact that a government is necessarily a means towards realizing all conditions without which human rights cannot exist and develop. Starting out with this fundamental conception, social institutions will then be assigned their real value, and a suitable course will be given to the exercise of the public powers whereby social and political habits and customs will be determined.

"Government procedure up to the present has not been able to establish itself due to the fact that the Mexican people have not believed in a social pact that placed all political organization in the divine origin of a monarch, a master of life and property. They have relied on institutions which, although embodying high principles, are not adapted to their manner of thinking and feeling, and are far from satisfying their needs. These institutions at present completely lack vitality, because they have been dominated by an enervating military despotism and by iniquitous exploitation, which has thrown the most populous classes into despair and ruin.

FOR INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY.

"I have already stated that the first duty of government is to assist in bringing about the necessary conditions for the organization of legislation, or, what amounts to the same thing, to be careful to maintain intact individual liberty. For this reason, the first thing the political constitution of a nation should do is to prevent the government, on the pretext of preserving peace and order (reasons always alleged by tyrants to justify their actions), from restricting individual rights and arrogating to itself the exclusive right to direct individual initiative and social activity by enslaving the individual and society. The Constitution of 1857, as I have already stated, declared that the rights of the individual are the basis and object of all social institutions; but, with few exceptions, did not grant such rights or sufficient guarantees. The secondary laws did not severely punish the violation of such guarantees, because they only provided insignificant penalties, which were hardly ever enforced. So that, without fear of exaggeration, it may be said that, in spite of the aforesaid Constitution, individual liberty remained entirely at the mercy of the rulers. The numerous attempts against individual rights and their various manifestations during the period in which the Constitution of 1857 has been in force are surprising. *Not a day had passed without complaints against the abuses and excesses of the authorities from one end to the other of the republic, and, notwithstanding the frequency of the evil and the trouble it constantly caused the Federal judicial authority made no effort to put an end to this state of affairs or to punish those guilty for it.* Imagination cannot even form an idea of the innumerable cases of appeals from being drafted into the army, or against the arbitrary actions of justices of the peace. The mere declaration of a right, the mere proclamation of a basic principle of social and political order, is a futile bulwark with which to contest long-established tradition and the inveterate habits and customs of an authority invested with omnipotent powers. These have been so far-reaching that often the people have had no other alternative but silence and obedience.

TO CORRECT EVILS.

"It is to correct these evils that my Administration brings forward the various reforms bearing on the first section of the first part of the Constitution of 1857, and I hope that with them and the severe penalties imposed by the Penal Code for the violation of individual guarantees, the public authorities will be compelled to be what they should be, namely, the safeguards of society, instead of what they have been, the oppressors of those who have had the misfortune to fall into their hands.

"The Government emanating from the revolution—and this is known throughout the republic—has taken particular care to encourage education in all social spheres. I firmly believe that this impulse will not only continue, but will be intensified day by day, so that the Mexicans will become a cultured people, capable of realizing their high destinies, and able to give to their national Government such solid and efficacious coöperation as will make anarchy, on the one hand, and a dictatorship, on the other, impossible. The independent municipality is undoubtedly one of the great achievements of the revolution, as well as the basis of a free Government, a conquest which not only gives political freedom to municipal life, but also economic independence, since the municipality will have its own funds and resources with which to meet its needs, thus being taken out of reach of the insatiable greed generally shown by governors.

"Tocqueville observed in his study of the history of the American peoples of Spanish origin that the latter turn to anarchy when they are tired of obedience, and to a dictatorship when tired of destruction, and he considers that this oscillation between order and violence is the fatal law which governed and will govern for a long time those nations. This theorist did not say what, in his opinion, would be the means of getting rid of the evil, which he could quite easily done had he observed really the cedents of each case and the cir stances under which revolution invari occurs."

Here Gen. Carranza launched into an analysis of "strong governments" as contrasted with "despotic governments," and pointed out that certain superior classes have always blundered in thinking that the way to produce order was to ignore the law.

"That, and nothing else," continued Mr. Carranza, "was the cause of the fatal habit of which Tocqueville spoke, because a dictatorship will no more produce peace or order than darkness will produce light."

The First Chief, who is soon to be President of Mexico, is a man of rare political ability. He is undoubtedly, of all the revolutionists produced in the last six years in Mexico, by far the most learned and the most cultured. He was a Senator from, as well as Governor of, the state of Coahuila in the days of Diaz. He has seen Mexico under conditions old and new. He is proceeding slowly, and, disturbed by no outside influence, is bound to be remembered in Mexican history as one of its greatest statesmen.

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XII.

OBREGON AND GONZALES —THEIR PERSONALITIES

Generals of the Revolution Support Carranza Loyally—Both are Thoroughgoing Constitutionalists Who Enlisted Against Huerta on Principle.

Mexico City, December, 1916.

UNTIL revolutionary governments take the form of stable administrations ruled by a chief executive whose words and commands become inviolate, it is not unusual to find the body politic governed by a group of military chiefs. Mexico is no exception, but to-day the southern republic is passing through that evolutionary stage wherein the lesser chiefs have become incorporated in the military strength or prestige of a few greater ones.

Next to Gen. Carranza there are two men in Mexico to-day whose political and military power constitutes an essential part of the whole fabric of the Constitutionalist Administration. They are Gen. Alvaro Obregon and Gen. Pablo Gonzales. Without their coöperation, without their consent, Gen. Carranza could not administer the office of chief executive—a central government would be virtually hopeless. And whenever two men ascend to such strategic heights, it is as natural as it is inevitable in Mexico that doubt should at once be cast on their individual loyalty to the higher authority. Frequently subordinate colonels or chiefs, through hopes of self-advancement, spur their leaders on to revolt; they engage in intrigue and sooner or later, by creating an atmosphere of jealousy and suspicion, easily discover a pretext for a quarrel and urge it upon their superiors. If the latter be unscrupulous and without moral character, ambitious and fearless, as was Huerta, no obstacle, not even assassination, will be permitted to stand in the way of accomplishing a usurpation.

Many persons have thus worked on Gens. Gonzales and Obregon, some of them on the pretence of deep friendship, in an effort to effect a break with Carranza, but with no success. The conspirators have, however, been able to stir up jealousy between the staffs of the two generals, and to contribute no little embarrassment to both. But neither general is himself unscrupulous, neither is a fool, and neither wants to start a revolt of arms. The certainty alone of an American occupation as a sequel does not make the responsibility for a new revolution seem particularly attractive.

BOTH SUPPORT CARRANZA.

As a matter of fact, Alvaro Obregon and Pablo Gonzales are thoroughgoing Constitutionalists. They enlisted in the revolt against Huerta purely on principle. If they have any ambitions, they will desire to satisfy them through the regular electoral processes some day, but not through another arbitrary overthrow of constitutional government. And both men are earnest and sincere in their support of Gen. Carranza's candidacy for President, which is unopposed.

Both Gens. Obregon and Gonzales were in the city during my stay here, and I spent an hour or more with each, talking about domestic troubles, the effect of the reëlection of President Wilson, the Pershing expedition, and other subjects of mutual interest. I found Gen. Gonzales at Tacubaya, a suburb, where he and his staff had occupied the home of Fernando de Teresa, a millionaire now in Europe. I had heard a great deal about requisitioning houses, but after a stroll through this immense estate, I came to the conclusion that not only had Don Pablo taken good care not to destroy anything in the big dwelling, but he actually had detailed several men to trim the gardens daily and generally clean it up, for the place had been unoccupied for several years. And when Fernando de Teresa comes home, he'll find his mansion, furniture, gardens, Italian pools, swimming tank, bowling alley, theatre, art gallery, stables, miniature railway, trees, and arbors in just as good condition as when he left.

Don Pablo is fond of horses and ponies and must needs show me his collection. A few minutes he spent reading military telegrams and then he sat down to talk. He had a rather disagreeable experience with Gregory Mason's interview in the *Outlook*—a *bona-fide* interview by the way, because copies of it were sent also to all the newspaper correspondents in Mexico City, but containing things rather indiscreet to say during the pendency of a Presidential election in the United States. So Gen. Gonzales fights shy of quoted interviews. As a matter of fact, what he said in that interview represented what he actually felt—that the open enmity of Hughes was to be preferred to the incomprehensible friendship of Wilson. It was a typical view here—the Mexicans wanted to know if the United States really was planning intervention or occupation and wanted to know how to prepare against it. Or they sought to know what *to be sure* was back of the many conflicting moves on the part of their northern neighbor.

GLAD WILSON WON.

But Pablo Gonzales really was glad Wilson won. On the whole, the election was considered favorable to Mexico and the feeling prevailed that if the Americans really were sincere, they now would withdraw the Pershing expedition, and there would be no international difficulty. Gen. Gonzales is a man of considerable character and integrity. He says very little, but you can rely on his word. He is very popular among the foreigners. He was in the milling business before the revolution began, and his military success has resulted merely from the application of business sense to a military organization. He has been in the United States a great deal, has done business with Americans and foreigners, and handles himself very well indeed. Even the most disgruntled member of the American colony in Mexico City and he will say: "Oh, Gen. Gonzales is all right. He's a good administrator. If there were more like him." The same is true of Tampico, San Luis Potosi—every place that he has been stationed.

Don Pablo is a favorite of Gen. Carranza. Both come from the same state, Coahuila—and their friendship dates many years. Friction between them of any serious character is very improbable. In a sense, Gen. Gonzales is a creature of Gen. Carranza, and throughout all the instructions with Villa and the dissension

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the Constitutionalist camp, not a bit of doubt prevailed that Gonzales would stick to the First Chief through thick and thin. His square jaw, in fact the lines of face, are those of a man of character. It is what we are accustomed to call a *strong* face. His hair is jet black and runs somewhat to the football crop. He wears gold spectacles and a black fedora hat, a plain sack suit and polka-dot vest—at least this was his Sunday morning garb, and I noticed that he was the only man at headquarters who didn't wear a uniform, which is a fact of no small significance, because in Mexico there seems to be some kind of contest or rivalry on among the generals and colonels, captains and lieutenants to see who can design the most distinctive uniform out of khaki, or olive drab, an abundance of brass buttons and gold lace, and a study of military fashion plates of generations.

Indeed, the interesting thing to the casual observer of both Obregon and Gonzales would be that they didn't look like military men at all. They might be business men, bankers, or merchants for all the outsider knew. Gen. Obregon, for instance, when I visited him at his home in the military school alongside Chapultepec Castle, wore a heavy gray sweater and mufti of the plainest.

OBREGON HAS "PUNCH."

Alvaro Obregon is an engaging figure and a winning personality. He can be just as anti-American as any one else in Mexico and as *simpatico*, too, though, to be sure, whenever I investigate the effects of our crudely worked out policy toward Mexico, I am not surprised that anti-Americanism is so infectious. Obregon is a man of force. He has the punch Americans love to admire. He is honest. He is good-hearted. He is a brave commander and a tactful one. He has never lost a battle in nearly three years of constant campaigning. When I saw him he was going through a rather excruciating experience. The stub of his left arm which had parted company with a powerful right hand at the last battle of Celaya against Villa was in a cast. He had slipped on the stairway a few days before and fractured the upper arm. Yet he was up and about carrying on his duties of Minister of War from his residence. And he had time to work on a book that he is writing covering his experiences in the campaigns of the present revolution, his thousands of miles of marches and countermarches, his sweep from the Arizona border through Sonora and along the Pacific Coast to Mexico City against Huerta—he was the first to enter there in 1914—and his northward pursuit and spectacular defeat of Villa, after which the latter took to the mountains. If Gen. Murgia fails in Chihuahua, Gen. Obregon expects to take the field himself against the northern bandit.

Gen. Obregon is what Americans would call a reasonable man. He has neither the wisdom nor the profundity of a statesman—and doesn't pretend to have. He is a man of utter simplicity, a man without guile, direct, emphatic, energetic, and true blue. People who gossip of intrigue and disloyalty in his connection simply do not know the man. I like his good-humor. Some people say he has inherited it from Irish ancestors. Certainly his spirit is a youthful one; his years are thirty-six. He has just married and with him lives an older sister.

HIS VIEW ON OUR FEARS.

We talked about the embargo on arms and international questions. Gen. Obregon was matter-of-fact and frank. I told him that ever since Carrizal people in the United States had been so uncertain about the future status of their relations with Mexico, however well disposed the American Government might be, public opinion would not sanction the arming of a possible foe. Gen. Obregon understood that in an instant—it was merely military necessity. But he was just as sure American apprehensions about Mexico were ill-founded, and that there was to be peace, not war. And, moreover, the embarrassment about arms was over, he confessed, because machinery had been imported, and Mexican arsenals were turning out thousands and thousand cartridges every day—sufficient at a rate with which to conduct the various campaigns against bandits.

By his conversation it was easy to see that Gen. Obregon had perfect confidence in Gen. Carranza's ability to handle the international situation. He did not insist on knowing details or interjecting a point of view. Don Venustiano could interpret the Mexican point of view on such matters. Nationalism is never an ambiguous thing, anyway. It permits of no surrender of any of the sacred rights sovereignty, no yielding of the nation independence—and these principles, nothing more and nothing less, underlie Mexico's cautious, even suspicious, attitude toward her big, powerful, resourceful neighbor—the United States.

Obregon and Gonzales are from the north of Mexico, virile personal ties. The combined military strength, distributed through a lot of lesser generals and chiefs, was the instrument by which the revolution was won first against Huerta and then against the organized warfare of Villa. Their tasks are not done. Banditry, the sequel of organized fighting, still prevails, as it did in Madero's time, as it ever will until the central authority has been firmly enough established to get money wherewith to supply and train an efficient force for bandit hunting, a job many times as difficult as an out-and-out fight, as our own experience with Indian forays and bushwhacking will testify. All of this takes time. And America can once be assured that Mexico has in her leadership men of capacity, the moral help necessary to enable the *de facto* Government to obtain credit and the elements wherewith to combat banditry, industrial troubles, and other disturbances, ought not to be long withheld. Again, seeing is believing, and fair-minded observations will bring convincing proof that Mexico indeed has the moral capacity, needing only certain material aid or elements to become master of herself.

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XIII.

DEFECTS IN AMERICAN POLICY

Principle of Wilson Policy of Altruism Correct, but Execution Clumsy—Some of the Disastrous Mistakes of the Past—Constructive Suggestions for the Future.

Washington, D. C., December, 1916.

IT is all very well to interpret Mexico in terms of evolutionary development, to appraise at true values the disturbances there, and point out the slow but certain movement forward of the *de facto* Government and the Mexican people; but, you will ask, how can the United States solve its immediate problem, what about banditry, what about the Americans being killed in Chihuahua, and what of Villa, the Pershing expedition, and the International Commission? To put these questions succinctly: what policy would be suggested by this correspondent or any other, for that matter, who had made a similar tour of observation? Suppose one were suddenly given by the United States Government the responsibility of handling the whole business, what would be the first steps taken?

The solution can be simply stated. It requires, first, a sincere desire to *understand* the Latin character, and, second, an ability to *execute* the obvious policy which such an understanding dictates. Some day when the curtain is lifted and the whole record of our dealings with Mexico is revealed to the naked eye, America will not feel very proud of her performances. There is in them every evidence of an honest, patriotic wish to help Mexico to her feet, but a regrettable drama of errors, blunders, and misconceptions which have wounded Mexico and hurt as well the prestige of the United States, inciting anti-American spirit and leaving the two Governments to-day mutually suspicious of each other, respectively irritated, and as far from understanding each other as they were nearly four years ago when the trouble started.

There are occasions when the higher patriotism is to write in criticism of one's Government. "The king can do no wrong" is a motto that should have no place in the vocabulary of republican peoples. America's policy toward Mexico has not been at fault in principle, but disastrously clumsy in execution thereof. We have expressed ourselves crudely, and we have acted inconsistently. But fortunately we have not lost our opportunity. We can still convince Mexico that the United States is her best friend, if we will but be big enough, aye generous enough, to deal with her as only a great and powerful nation like ours can act toward a weak and struggling neighbor or as one honorable nation should act toward another of similar integrity.

NEITHER SIDE TRUSTS THE OTHER.

I have just come from Mexico City and Queretaro, where I sat down with many old friends, in and out of the Government, discussing for many hours Mexico's attitude toward the United States. I have talked many hours here, too, with officials of the United States Government in the last five years. The two Governments are far apart, too far. *They have not even reached the point of actual trust. Neither believes in the other. Neither will take the word of the other. On the surface, friendship, the hypocritical kind that leads to wars, prevails; underneath are the bitterest of resentments, even ill-concealed enmity. It is just as true in both capitals—in Washington as well as Mexico City.*

It would be superfluous here to analyze the Lind mission, the odd spectacle of the American Government laying down specific conditions for the holding of an election in sovereign Mexico; it would serve no good purpose now to tell what harm the occupation of Vera Cruz did, what doubt it cast upon America's intentions, but there are things happening to-day before our very eyes that are doing harm and that some day may force war on an unwilling American people if a halt is not soon called by an alert American public opinion.

OUR ABSURDLY INADEQUATE REPRESENTATION.

Does the average American know, for example, that the business of the great United States Government is being handled in Mexico by one or two clerks, neither of whom is accredited to the Carranza Government, neither of whom is in the diplomatic service, neither of whom has had the training or experience to express to Mexico the many good purposes which the United States has in mind toward her neighbor? Who talks to Carranza for us; who explains our purposes? No one.

Does the average American know, too, that friendly diplomatic relations were renewed with the recognition of the *de facto* Government a year ago, and yet in all that time an American Ambassador has not been sent to Mexico nor even a *Chargé d'Affaires*—no one except a special agent or two, whose status differed not a bit from the status of the special agents sent before a Government was recognized in Mexico.

Is Mexico to be blamed for suspecting the good faith of the United States when the latter hesitates to shake hands, to make good the promise to send an ambassador, a promise given more than a year ago? What is the real explanation in Washington of the failure to send Ambassador Fletcher? Well, first, the Republicans filibustered and his confirmation was delayed several weeks. When he was finally confirmed, last spring, the American Government decided that it wouldn't be "dignified" to send an Ambassador to Mexico "just yet." In other words, it was decided to wait until Mexico was in complete peace, when an Ambassador would be of only one-hundredth as much good to Mexico or to the United States as he could be to-day. An American Ambassador should have been in Mexico for many months, dignity to the contrary notwithstanding. He should have been rendering help to Mexico, as well as looking out for Americans and their interests, but above all, he should have been giving the United States Government and the American people the benefit of his observation and his judgment. We haven't even known the facts from unbiassed sources.

No better man than Henry P. Fletcher could have been chosen Ambassador. He has had long experience in Latin countries. He is a former Rough Rider, but a versatile diplomat, a man of charm. He talks the language of Latin America, and grasps its thought. He is *simpatico*. He is tactful; he is resourceful. He would be able from Mexico City—on the ground—to advise the President and Secretary of State on matters of policy. Mexico wants him to come. He is young and enthusias-

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tic. Why shouldn't he go at once? And wouldn't that very act carry to the Mexican mind, as well as the whole world, the conviction that peace, and not a break in relations, was contemplated by the United States? Would it not remove doubt as to American plans?

A HOT AND COLD POLICY.

The policy of the Administration at Washington ever since it recognized Carranza has been intermittently hot and cold. We have never whole-heartedly given our moral support to the *de facto* Government. This has always been held back while we were waiting for something—peace and order, perhaps—waiting for the very things to happen which the United States ought to have ungrudgingly helped Mexico to make happen.

Let us look at the Pershing expedition. It entered Mexico without Mexico's permission. When it crossed the line a statement was issued by the War Department at the direction of the President, saying the American troops would be withdrawn as soon as Carranza Government forces could arrive on the scene to take control. Enough Carranza troops arrived, but the American Government did not withdraw. Instead, it brushed against Mexican forces at Carrizal, and then it settled down to a quiet occupation of Mexican territory without accomplishing its original object. Its quarrel had been with Villa. Carranza certainly had not raided American territory. But failing to catch Villa, the American troops were held on Mexican soil *as a bargaining lever with Carranza, as a means of getting something out of weak and struggling Mexico—getting what? Why, promises of protection for foreigners, and effective patrol of the border.* Yet any one who knows Mexico knows that such promises are not worth the paper they are written on unless there is a strong central Government to enforce them, unless there is a stable Government, financially able to pay its troops and organize them as was Diaz. But did the United States keep sight of that dominant fact? Did it take account of the injury it was doing the central Government, the embarrassment it was imposing before the world by casting doubt upon its own friendliness or moral support of the Government it had only a few months before recognized? Mexicans do not like foreign troops on their soil any more than we do. Turn to the Far East, where Japan on the slightest provocation sends troops into the territory of helpless China, while a suspicious world looks on, if you want to understand what Mexico and Latin America secretly think when the Funston forces or the Pershing expeditions are roaming on the sovereign territory of the Mexican republic in Vera Cruz or Chihuahua.

BARGAINING ABOUT SOVEREIGNTY RIGHTS.

The United States did not withdraw the troops, as so frequently promised. Mexico threatened, but soon realized the futility of threats. Mexico, like China, was too feeble to resist. A commission was appointed really to bridge the crisis that arose at Carrizal. The Presidential campaign here delayed matters. The Mexican indulgently understood. Now the campaign is over. Gen. Carranza had been promised that if he agreed to discuss all the points involved in the Mexican problem, the question of withdrawal of American troops would be discussed "preferentially." It would be taken up and disposed of first. Privately he suggested a wide discussion later. He wanted this procedure so that Mexico would not be in the position of bargaining with her Northern neighbor for rights of sovereignty, so that Mexico's territory could be free of foreign troops when a discussion of other matters was begun.

Was that promise of the United States to withdraw the American troops and then discuss the other questions really kept in letter or in spirit? There are doubts. The Joint Commission, acting presumably under instruction from Washington, asked for the settlement of many other questions along with the border problem. It took up a variety of other subjects, and only lately drew up a protocol about the withdrawal of Pershing. Has it taken Mexico's word that as soon as the troops were withdrawn she would discuss other problems of international importance? Not yet. Mexico isn't to be trusted, says Washington. Why, as soon as the Pershing expedition is withdrawn, the Mexicans wouldn't care anything about the other problems, and would hem and haw and do nothing—that is the real American point of view. Is Mexico to be given a chance to prove her good faith? No, the assumption upon which action is based is the same assumption that the White Papers and the Orange Papers and the Red Books reek with.

And when the protocols are submitted, a statement is issued separately by the United States threatening unlimited pursuit of bandits in Mexico. That was a threat of more punitive expeditions. It was a warning that in withdrawing Pershing now, Mexico might have other expeditions to worry about if she didn't do what? If she didn't stop border raids. And Mexico is powerless to stop border raids so long as her Government is weak. The Government of Mexico cannot be strong if it is at odds with the United States, if the United States keeps casting doubt on its capacity. Its credit remains depressed. Was the statement of unlimited pursuit consistent with "moral support"? On the contrary, it reacted in Mexico in a way quite different from that which was supposed. It was construed as an official threat. That's why Gen. Carranza didn't sign the American protocols. What is the use of signing a deed for a lot the sale of which you are just completing, when the seller reminds you that if your children play in his front yard, he will come over and lick your whole family? That isn't neighborliness. That depreciates the value of the lot, deed and all. Gen. Carranza had to point out that he could not let such a statement of hostile intention pass unnoticed. His commissioners will probably have to accept, after all, the American programme, and discuss questions of various kinds while the Pershing expedition is on Mexican soil. What remedy has Gen. Carranza? He can't go to war about it. But is it any wonder that Americans are not liked in Mexico? Is this the way to build international friendships? The methods used sound strangely like Japanese coercion of China, like the ultimatum which China was compelled to accept in 1915 because there was no alternative.

UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF SMUGGLING.

While I was in Mexico, a bitter anti-American speech was made in the Constituent Assembly at Queretaro by a member of the Carranza Cabinet, Candido Aguilar. This was why: Although Mexico has today a constituted Government, and by all our laws is entitled to ammunition, the embargo, declared after Carrizal, never has been lifted. Villa smuggles on the northern border, largely because of the inefficient secret service and some corrupt state officials in Texas and New Mexico. Carranza's military men decide to do some smuggling, too. A cargo of ammunition is consigned as machinery on board the Ward liner Esperanza. As the boxes are being unloaded at Vera Cruz, a crane breaks, and one box falls, spilling cartridges on the docks. Promptly American officials are advised. The captain of the Illinois, lying in the harbor, orders no further unloading until he can communicate with Washington. He should have known that the place to prevent smuggling was in New York harbor. There is some delay. The Mexican Government at Queretaro is advised. That same day Villa defeats the Carranza garrison at Chihuahua. The Mexican leaders at Queretaro infer that the United States is doing all it can to prevent the *de facto* Government from succeeding. Yet the United States wants the northern campaign against bandits prosecuting vigorously. Is it any wonder that the simple Mexican mind evolves the idea of double dealing

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from that incident? The ammunition at Vera Cruz is finally released to the Mexicans, but the effect of the manœuvre is not lost. It creates much ill-feeling in Mexico. Yet in the United States this has probably never been printed. It illustrates why the two nations do not trust each other.

But here is another illustration: The United States is not content to keep ammunition from being exported to Mexico from the United States. The Government of Salvador is approached by the State Department and warned against selling any ammunition to the Carranza Government. A protest is made. The State Department finally yields. Is this the procedure of friendship? Is this "moral support"?

MEXICO MANUFACTURING AMMUNITION.

To-day the Mexicans are manufacturing enough ammunition themselves to get along. But if they succeed in establishing a strong Government, will they forget who embarrassed them as they were struggling to their feet? Mexicans never forget.

The Mexican Government is in its infancy. It no doubt has handled its foreign affairs sometimes in a fashion exasperating to our State Department. There are no trained diplomats versed in international etiquette in the Mexican Foreign Office as yet. These things come in later stages of a new Government. They take time. Instead of bearing patiently with these faults of etiquette, and putting in Mexico an Ambassador who is himself tactful enough to overcome such handicaps, the officials of our Government chafe because their representations are not promptly attended to, representations handled by men not even accredited officially to the *de facto* Government, and who have neither the initiative nor the authority to push those representations along with the proper authorities.

Mexico must be dealt with honorably, as one man expects another to deal with him. Let us ask Mexico what she wants. The answer will be this: Withdrawal of Pershing, a vigilant patrol of the border, and enforcement of neutrality in the United States; preventing refugee Mexicans from financing and plotting new revolutionary movements, and the issuance of a warm pronouncement by the United States of moral support of the *de facto* Government. The United States ought to grant this without asking a thing in return. The sense of honor of the Mexican is as highly developed as that of an American. When you loan a man money, you usually don't ask him if he will loan you some when you need it. You don't want that stipulated in advance. You inwardly expect it, and if he is able, you trust he will reciprocate.

By disentangling ourselves from bargains, and ceasing to treat Mexico as a suspect, as some one who will not keep her word, we will lay a new foundation for Mexican-American relations.

THE SLATE SHOULD BE CLEANED.

We ought to start out with a clean slate. We should withdraw Gen. Pershing's forces at once, and not try to drive any bargains. His work is over. Let the United States stop embarrassing Carranza, who is being held up every day before the ignorant masses in Mexico by Villa as the traitor who sits supinely by while American troops camp on the sacred soil of Mexico. Villa has been issuing proclamation after proclamation to the people of north Mexico, claiming that he is about to attack the "foreign invader." He appeals to their patriotic passions, telling them Mexico is at war with the United States, and the masses in northern Mexico, having no newspapers with which to verify the report, naturally credit it. Then Villa recruits a few thousand men, descends on a small garrison at Chihuahua or Torreon, holds the city for a few days until the Carranza forces in greater numbers arrive on the scene, and then retreats to the mountains.

It costs much money for the Carranza Government to carry on a campaign against one who simply robs foreigners of their gold bullion, and gives it to the peon troops as pay. The Carranza authorities need a loan wherewith to equip their army, yet in the United States the mere capture of Chihuahua or Torreon for a few days makes the Government of the United States hesitant about continuing to support the *de facto* Government, and thereby gives to these incidents an importance which they ought never to have. For in Mexico the state of Chihuahua is looked upon as a wild country, the disturbances in which bear no real relation to the score of states of the republic where almost normal conditions prevail. Some people have an idea that the presence of Pershing has a salutary effect on Villa, and that with the latter's small success, the Pershing expedition should not now of all times be withdrawn; but by keeping Pershing in Mexico, we strengthen Villa's hand and antagonize Carranza, encouraging conditions of anarchy. Gen. Pershing is hundreds of miles north of Torreon, where Villa is operating, and Villa will keep that distance between them if Pershing is withdrawn to the American line. He will never come close again for a raid, because the American troops have learned a lesson and will not be caught napping a second time.

And simultaneous with the withdrawal of our troops let Ambassador Fletcher start for Mexico to carry forward this programme of constructive friendship. Let us stop issuing threats and informing bandits exactly how they can provoke international complications. Let us stand by the Government we have recognized and help it make good by not asking a thing for ourselves. But, some American officials will say, isn't this giving Mexico her own way; isn't this giving up our "rights?" The answer is to be found in this question: Aren't we big enough to give Mexico what she wants, what she thinks will give her internal peace and stability? Can't we afford once to take her word for it? For certainly if Mexico is right and a strong central government issues, there will be no border raids, no further assault on Americans in Mexico, but peace and order. And if the Carranza Government is wrong and fails, having been *sincerely* helped, would the American Government not find a unanimous opinion later, instead of the divided opinion of to-day as to certain other drastic measures that might then be inevitable?

But Mexico knows her own problem and peculiar conditions, and will never consciously furnish a pretext for intervention. She needs American help, and if she gets it, will reciprocate. Her self-respect and honor will compel it. Let America deal with Mexico on a basis of honor, as nations should, and the results that will flow therefrom will be a revelation in diplomacy—the actual fulfilment of the ideals we describe so eloquently in words, but all too seldom translate in deeds.

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